

TOM ROGAN

**JOURNALIST
FOR THE
WASHINGTON
EXAMINER**



1
00:00:19,929 --> 00:00:03,590
what's up this is Sean and this is Jay

2
00:00:35,229 --> 00:00:23,150
we're going to talk about flying saucers

3
00:00:38,090 --> 00:00:35,239
[Music]

4
00:00:39,690 --> 00:00:38,100
flying saucers

5
00:00:48,950 --> 00:00:39,700
foreign

6
00:00:52,790 --> 00:00:51,529
what's up Jay how you doing sir I'm

7
00:00:55,549 --> 00:00:52,800
doing really well how are you doing

8
00:00:58,369 --> 00:00:55,559
today I'm okay I'm hanging in there uh

9
00:01:00,229 --> 00:00:58,379
we got in there great guest today uh Mr

10
00:01:02,450 --> 00:01:00,239
Tom Rogan so I'm super excited about

11
00:01:04,490 --> 00:01:02,460
that yeah I'm very excited about that as

12
00:01:07,429 --> 00:01:04,500
well he's going to be joining us in just

13
00:01:10,490 --> 00:01:07,439

a little bit yeah um so we have a little

14

00:01:12,910 --> 00:01:10,500

bit of time to catch up with each other

15

00:01:16,789 --> 00:01:12,920

catch up with the folks in the chat yeah

16

00:01:20,630 --> 00:01:16,799

time should be here in about a half hour

17

00:01:22,310 --> 00:01:20,640

so about 25 minutes from now so we can

18

00:01:24,770 --> 00:01:22,320

start the countdown

19

00:01:26,090 --> 00:01:24,780

yeah

20

00:01:28,670 --> 00:01:26,100

if you're in the chat and you don't have

21

00:01:31,010 --> 00:01:28,680

your popcorn yet or if you're in the UK

22

00:01:32,570 --> 00:01:31,020

and it's already you know happy hour or

23

00:01:35,090 --> 00:01:32,580

something like that

24

00:01:36,289 --> 00:01:35,100

um you know feel free to run off to the

25

00:01:37,969 --> 00:01:36,299

fridge

26

00:01:40,370 --> 00:01:37,979

um it's wonderful to see everybody in

27

00:01:43,789 --> 00:01:40,380

the chat yeah what's up everybody in the

28

00:01:47,929 --> 00:01:43,799

trip uh Andre's sword water lily Zach

29

00:01:54,889 --> 00:01:51,710

um Robert good to see you Jos is back

30

00:01:57,530 --> 00:01:54,899

Sun saver super great to have everybody

31

00:01:58,069 --> 00:01:57,540

here so

32

00:02:00,830 --> 00:01:58,079

um

33

00:02:03,889 --> 00:02:00,840

you know there hasn't been

34

00:02:07,429 --> 00:02:03,899

too much news

35

00:02:09,710 --> 00:02:07,439

lightly although you know and I hate to

36

00:02:11,570 --> 00:02:09,720

do this but I just feel like I gotta

37

00:02:14,030 --> 00:02:11,580

keep talking about Liberation Time stuff

38

00:02:17,330 --> 00:02:14,040

because Chris just has such a great job

39

00:02:19,550 --> 00:02:17,340

covering this stuff so he sure does it

40

00:02:21,890 --> 00:02:19,560

sure does yeah that is

41

00:02:25,369 --> 00:02:21,900

and you know if anything it's a good

42

00:02:28,010 --> 00:02:25,379

it's a good thought to you know

43

00:02:32,270 --> 00:02:28,020

um so let me I'll share this link in the

44

00:02:35,089 --> 00:02:32,280

chat but uh basically it's the idea of a

45

00:02:37,550 --> 00:02:35,099

uh Church committee coming to Congress

46

00:02:38,990 --> 00:02:37,560

in regards to like UAP so for those that

47

00:02:40,190 --> 00:02:39,000

weren't familiar the church committee

48

00:02:43,970 --> 00:02:40,200

was done

49

00:02:46,009 --> 00:02:43,980

uh many uh decades ago

50

00:02:49,130 --> 00:02:46,019

and it basically uncovered a lot of the

51
00:02:52,309 --> 00:02:49,140
like MK Ultra I believe in some some

52
00:02:53,690 --> 00:02:52,319
like abuses the intelligence agency

53
00:02:56,150 --> 00:02:53,700
um was

54
00:02:58,250 --> 00:02:56,160
you know was conducting on people MK

55
00:03:01,430 --> 00:02:58,260
Ultra was where they were basically

56
00:03:03,589 --> 00:03:01,440
doping up citizens with acid and all

57
00:03:05,330 --> 00:03:03,599
that kind of stuff so

58
00:03:07,729 --> 00:03:05,340
um pretty interesting stuff so the idea

59
00:03:09,949 --> 00:03:07,739
of this church committee is to you know

60
00:03:12,350 --> 00:03:09,959
the idea of looking back through the

61
00:03:14,630 --> 00:03:12,360
intelligence community and other areas

62
00:03:16,850 --> 00:03:14,640
of the government for things like that

63
00:03:19,729 --> 00:03:16,860

those are pieces of power illegal things

64

00:03:23,270 --> 00:03:19,739

whether it be providing misinformation

65

00:03:25,550 --> 00:03:23,280

on purpose regarding UAP or things of

66

00:03:27,170 --> 00:03:25,560

that sort so

67

00:03:29,210 --> 00:03:27,180

um then they added a couple quotes from

68

00:03:31,610 --> 00:03:29,220

Lou Elizondo in here of course saying

69

00:03:33,589 --> 00:03:31,620

that t uh would support that so what's

70

00:03:35,649 --> 00:03:33,599

he gonna say no I don't support that

71

00:03:38,149 --> 00:03:35,659

right but yeah

72

00:03:39,770 --> 00:03:38,159

and I think one of the one of the more

73

00:03:41,149 --> 00:03:39,780

interesting things in here yeah so the

74

00:03:44,330 --> 00:03:41,159

original Church committee that was back

75

00:03:47,449 --> 00:03:44,340

in 1975 investigating abuses by U.S

76
00:03:49,610 --> 00:03:47,459
intelligence agencies and you know and

77
00:03:51,649 --> 00:03:49,620
Chris points out in his article that

78
00:03:54,110 --> 00:03:51,659
that's that a new version of that's been

79
00:03:56,750 --> 00:03:54,120
contemplated by some members of Congress

80
00:03:59,390 --> 00:03:56,760
since the Whistleblower language was

81
00:04:02,509 --> 00:03:59,400
published in the intelligence

82
00:04:04,130 --> 00:04:02,519
authorization Act of actually the the

83
00:04:07,250 --> 00:04:04,140
version that was originally introduced

84
00:04:09,350 --> 00:04:07,260
in back in July way back in July and so

85
00:04:11,509 --> 00:04:09,360
he's pointing out that the new

86
00:04:15,229 --> 00:04:11,519
Republican speaker of the house uh Kevin

87
00:04:18,289 --> 00:04:15,239
McCarthy who is narrowly approved at the

88
00:04:20,270 --> 00:04:18,299

end of last week very narrowly after was

89

00:04:23,830 --> 00:04:20,280

it 14 or 15 ballots or something like

90

00:04:27,409 --> 00:04:23,840

that um he's reportedly ready to support

91

00:04:29,990 --> 00:04:27,419

a committee like that to investigate

92

00:04:32,090 --> 00:04:30,000

government abuses in general including

93

00:04:36,050 --> 00:04:32,100

the FBI's relationship with social media

94

00:04:38,990 --> 00:04:36,060

companies right now that now that comes

95

00:04:42,290 --> 00:04:39,000

somewhat as no surprise after for those

96

00:04:44,870 --> 00:04:42,300

that um sit around on Twitter relatively

97

00:04:47,930 --> 00:04:44,880

frequently or even check in with it

98

00:04:50,990 --> 00:04:47,940

um you know Elon Musk who now runs

99

00:04:54,050 --> 00:04:51,000

Twitter has has been kind of retweeting

100

00:04:56,870 --> 00:04:54,060

and and encouraging

101
00:05:00,530 --> 00:04:56,880
people to look into

102
00:05:03,469 --> 00:05:00,540
um newly public documents that seem to

103
00:05:06,550 --> 00:05:03,479
show that that government agencies

104
00:05:10,450 --> 00:05:06,560
intelligence agencies have been

105
00:05:12,890 --> 00:05:10,460
involved or trying to help shape policy

106
00:05:14,469 --> 00:05:12,900
with social media companies including

107
00:05:17,450 --> 00:05:14,479
Facebook and Twitter

108
00:05:20,210 --> 00:05:17,460
right so that's a that's kind of a

109
00:05:22,969 --> 00:05:20,220
that's kind of the a launch pad for this

110
00:05:24,650 --> 00:05:22,979
and then fellow house Republican and

111
00:05:26,629 --> 00:05:24,660
incoming house intelligence committee

112
00:05:28,930 --> 00:05:26,639
chair Mike Turner who represents

113
00:05:32,029 --> 00:05:28,940

Wright-Patterson Air Force bases

114

00:05:34,310 --> 00:05:32,039

district has recently been damning of

115

00:05:35,810 --> 00:05:34,320

the FBI's resistance to turnover files

116

00:05:37,850 --> 00:05:35,820

regarding its relationship with social

117

00:05:39,890 --> 00:05:37,860

media companies and is contemplating the

118

00:05:42,170 --> 00:05:39,900

use of subpoena power if necessary

119

00:05:43,730 --> 00:05:42,180

behind the scenes those and this is in

120

00:05:46,070 --> 00:05:43,740

Chris's article behind the scenes those

121

00:05:48,710 --> 00:05:46,080

advocating for an effort to identify

122

00:05:51,529 --> 00:05:48,720

government equities and possibly illegal

123

00:05:53,570 --> 00:05:51,539

secretive programs relating to UAP would

124

00:05:55,969 --> 00:05:53,580

call for such a committee to extend and

125

00:05:58,189 --> 00:05:55,979

uncover further alleged abuses by

126
00:06:00,350 --> 00:05:58,199
intelligence agencies

127
00:06:02,270 --> 00:06:00,360
such a trajectory could reflect the

128
00:06:03,590 --> 00:06:02,280
revelations which have emerged from the

129
00:06:05,749 --> 00:06:03,600
church committee that started with the

130
00:06:08,510 --> 00:06:05,759
US Army spying on civilians and led to

131
00:06:10,310 --> 00:06:08,520
the uncovering of the cia's MK Ultra as

132
00:06:12,469 --> 00:06:10,320
you said Sean involving the drugging and

133
00:06:15,469 --> 00:06:12,479
torture of Unknowing U.S citizens as

134
00:06:18,350 --> 00:06:15,479
part of human experimentation on mind

135
00:06:20,330 --> 00:06:18,360
control how Wild is that

136
00:06:24,529 --> 00:06:20,340
right right

137
00:06:26,689 --> 00:06:24,539
just in torture of unknown U.S citizens

138
00:06:29,749 --> 00:06:26,699

like who would prove that

139

00:06:31,370 --> 00:06:29,759

right and this is not yeah you know you

140

00:06:33,350 --> 00:06:31,380

know and that and nothing again nothing

141

00:06:34,790 --> 00:06:33,360

about this is this is all in the

142

00:06:36,469 --> 00:06:34,800

historical record it's all in the

143

00:06:38,689 --> 00:06:36,479

Congressional Record you can even find

144

00:06:41,090 --> 00:06:38,699

videotapes of this this is not tin foil

145

00:06:43,189 --> 00:06:41,100

hat stuff this is this is we're just

146

00:06:45,170 --> 00:06:43,199

talking about stuff as it happened as as

147

00:06:46,430 --> 00:06:45,180

we try to as much as humanly possible on

148

00:06:48,529 --> 00:06:46,440

the show

149

00:06:50,450 --> 00:06:48,539

um you know the the one thing that I

150

00:06:52,909 --> 00:06:50,460

think of is uh you know they have this

151
00:06:55,270 --> 00:06:52,919
language in uh um authorization act

152
00:06:57,890 --> 00:06:55,280
about uh misinformation

153
00:06:59,029 --> 00:06:57,900
and looking into any programs or

154
00:07:00,710 --> 00:06:59,039
anything

155
00:07:02,510 --> 00:07:00,720
um of the sort where people provided

156
00:07:04,249 --> 00:07:02,520
misinformation whether it be like news

157
00:07:07,430 --> 00:07:04,259
outlets or other people probably within

158
00:07:09,890 --> 00:07:07,440
the government in regards to UAP and I

159
00:07:13,249 --> 00:07:09,900
think everybody pretty much

160
00:07:15,590 --> 00:07:13,259
um in the the UAP field are people who

161
00:07:17,210 --> 00:07:15,600
pay attention to UFOs always feel like

162
00:07:19,370 --> 00:07:17,220
the government has provided some

163
00:07:22,430 --> 00:07:19,380

misinformation whether it be the

164

00:07:25,730 --> 00:07:22,440

Robertson panel from the early 50s or

165

00:07:28,189 --> 00:07:25,740

you know the content report or just you

166

00:07:31,010 --> 00:07:28,199

know things like the Air Force going

167

00:07:33,110 --> 00:07:31,020

directly to Media think that things were

168

00:07:36,110 --> 00:07:33,120

you know something a pilot's always a

169

00:07:37,570 --> 00:07:36,120

planet or something of the sort

170

00:07:39,770 --> 00:07:37,580

um but I think there's also another

171

00:07:42,170 --> 00:07:39,780

facet to this that could be quite

172

00:07:44,629 --> 00:07:42,180

interesting as well

173

00:07:46,730 --> 00:07:44,639

um and and that's in direct relation to

174

00:07:49,670 --> 00:07:46,740

things like Richard Dottie

175

00:07:52,029 --> 00:07:49,680

you know completely providing people

176

00:07:55,189 --> 00:07:52,039

like Paul benowitz misinformation

177

00:07:57,350 --> 00:07:55,199

according to him at least and

178

00:07:59,210 --> 00:07:57,360

um other people as he stated before that

179

00:08:01,610 --> 00:07:59,220

he was you know a part of like five

180

00:08:04,249 --> 00:08:01,620

cases or something like that where he

181

00:08:05,990 --> 00:08:04,259

did that and that's misinformation so if

182

00:08:07,430 --> 00:08:06,000

you're going to go back on the record I

183

00:08:09,589 --> 00:08:07,440

would assume that that kind of thing

184

00:08:12,409 --> 00:08:09,599

would come out as well and I hope it

185

00:08:14,770 --> 00:08:12,419

does because that is such crap and it

186

00:08:17,210 --> 00:08:14,780

really aggravates me that that happened

187

00:08:19,730 --> 00:08:17,220

yeah no I agree with you and it's

188

00:08:20,990 --> 00:08:19,740

interesting because you know the it's

189

00:08:23,570 --> 00:08:21,000

interesting that you bring up Richard

190

00:08:27,350 --> 00:08:23,580

Dodie and and Paul benowitz because you

191

00:08:31,249 --> 00:08:27,360

know that case of misinforming a a

192

00:08:34,909 --> 00:08:31,259

person to such a strong degree that it

193

00:08:37,550 --> 00:08:34,919

led to the unraveling of you know their

194

00:08:40,550 --> 00:08:37,560

mental state and their mental Wellness

195

00:08:42,350 --> 00:08:40,560

um you know as Greg Bishop wrote in his

196

00:08:45,050 --> 00:08:42,360

book project beta

197

00:08:47,389 --> 00:08:45,060

um again this is all a matter of record

198

00:08:49,790 --> 00:08:47,399

um you know nothing speculative in in

199

00:08:52,070 --> 00:08:49,800

terms of like the nuts and bolts of this

200

00:08:53,750 --> 00:08:52,080

case anyway that Richard Doty even

201
00:08:57,230 --> 00:08:53,760
admits that that's what he was tasked to

202
00:08:59,389 --> 00:08:57,240
do and and for those that don't know you

203
00:09:02,210 --> 00:08:59,399
know there's there's a lot to say about

204
00:09:04,210 --> 00:09:02,220
somebody like right but um but he was

205
00:09:07,310 --> 00:09:04,220
essential actually tasked with

206
00:09:08,230 --> 00:09:07,320
investigating this guy Paul benowitz who

207
00:09:10,850 --> 00:09:08,240
had

208
00:09:12,290 --> 00:09:10,860
earnestly and innocently gotten in touch

209
00:09:14,630 --> 00:09:12,300
with an Air Force Base down in New

210
00:09:16,130 --> 00:09:14,640
Mexico because he thought that there

211
00:09:21,070 --> 00:09:16,140
were

212
00:09:23,389 --> 00:09:21,080
um uh UAP over this this secret base

213
00:09:26,509 --> 00:09:23,399

well not a secret base an air over

214

00:09:29,389 --> 00:09:26,519

Kirtland Air Force Base and around there

215

00:09:33,050 --> 00:09:29,399

there's there's another kind of a more

216

00:09:34,250 --> 00:09:33,060

secretive facility and so he got in

217

00:09:36,889 --> 00:09:34,260

touch because he thought that there were

218

00:09:39,170 --> 00:09:36,899

UAP there and he saw even that there was

219

00:09:41,750 --> 00:09:39,180

secret messaging that he was picking up

220

00:09:44,150 --> 00:09:41,760

on because he was he's an engineer and

221

00:09:45,710 --> 00:09:44,160

he had he was a quite the hobbyist and

222

00:09:48,290 --> 00:09:45,720

even a professional

223

00:09:51,050 --> 00:09:48,300

um was in that regard and so he he was

224

00:09:55,130 --> 00:09:51,060

quite good at at detection

225

00:09:57,350 --> 00:09:55,140

um and observation and RF and things

226

00:09:58,970 --> 00:09:57,360

like that and so this guy Richard Dodie

227

00:10:01,430 --> 00:09:58,980

was tasked with kind of following up on

228

00:10:06,710 --> 00:10:01,440

him and eventually had to kind of like

229

00:10:08,570 --> 00:10:06,720

weave this weave Paul benowitz away from

230

00:10:12,769 --> 00:10:08,580

the possibility of there being secret

231

00:10:15,410 --> 00:10:12,779

Tech at this base yes to basically said

232

00:10:18,410 --> 00:10:15,420

well I think what you may be seeing is

233

00:10:19,490 --> 00:10:18,420

the UFO right or extra Choice really you

234

00:10:25,730 --> 00:10:19,500

know

235

00:10:27,470 --> 00:10:25,740

this comment Mirage Man by uh Mr Skinny

236

00:10:29,870 --> 00:10:27,480

Bob that's it's a movie you can watch

237

00:10:31,370 --> 00:10:29,880

that was made kind of about that so it's

238

00:10:34,370 --> 00:10:31,380

definitely worth checking out because I

239

00:10:36,769 --> 00:10:34,380

think this is also kind of a problem in

240

00:10:38,269 --> 00:10:36,779

the UFO world for sure I mean Dodie's

241

00:10:40,430 --> 00:10:38,279

still out there he just did a

242

00:10:43,850 --> 00:10:40,440

documentary where he's talking about uh

243

00:10:46,190 --> 00:10:43,860

the these two ETS that were recovered

244

00:10:48,170 --> 00:10:46,200

and we had one for a while called and we

245

00:10:50,449 --> 00:10:48,180

use their you know technology to talk

246

00:10:52,790 --> 00:10:50,459

with them and all this stuff which I'm

247

00:11:03,490 --> 00:10:52,800

sorry sounds like complete more

248

00:11:07,970 --> 00:11:05,870

like the aliens really enjoyed the

249

00:11:10,130 --> 00:11:07,980

strawberry ice cream

250

00:11:12,710 --> 00:11:10,140

he says he said all sorts of things and

251

00:11:14,870 --> 00:11:12,720

and you know things like that like a

252

00:11:16,730 --> 00:11:14,880

strawberry ice cream move right I mean

253

00:11:19,069 --> 00:11:16,740

you have to

254

00:11:22,130 --> 00:11:19,079

you know there's there's a point where

255

00:11:24,350 --> 00:11:22,140

you know he has admitted that he has to

256

00:11:25,910 --> 00:11:24,360

do assessment or like that's what he was

257

00:11:28,730 --> 00:11:25,920

tasked to do right he was tasked to

258

00:11:31,250 --> 00:11:28,740

assess how people respond to things and

259

00:11:33,889 --> 00:11:31,260

so you know what I mean like these

260

00:11:36,530 --> 00:11:33,899

there's it reminds me of this kind of

261

00:11:38,329 --> 00:11:36,540

Nigerian prince scams where somebody

262

00:11:40,790 --> 00:11:38,339

emails you out of the blue and they're

263

00:11:42,530 --> 00:11:40,800

like quick I'm a Nigerian prince and I

264

00:11:45,050 --> 00:11:42,540

have millions of dollars I just need to

265

00:11:46,490 --> 00:11:45,060

like I just need you to forward me 5 000

266

00:11:49,250 --> 00:11:46,500

right now

267

00:11:51,889 --> 00:11:49,260

um and then I'll give you you know 11

268

00:11:54,710 --> 00:11:51,899

000 back or whatever it is and you know

269

00:11:56,630 --> 00:11:54,720

on the face of it it's ridiculous be you

270

00:11:58,670 --> 00:11:56,640

know people have done thorough studies

271

00:12:00,710 --> 00:11:58,680

of these things and there will be like

272

00:12:04,430 --> 00:12:00,720

intentional typos and stuff like that in

273

00:12:06,530 --> 00:12:04,440

these emails and it's because they like

274

00:12:07,910 --> 00:12:06,540

you know they've there have been

275

00:12:09,769 --> 00:12:07,920

interviews with people that have tried

276

00:12:12,470 --> 00:12:09,779

to pull off these scams and they say you

277

00:12:14,930 --> 00:12:12,480

know it's easier you want to make it

278

00:12:17,210 --> 00:12:14,940

unbelievable or you want to make it at

279

00:12:20,990 --> 00:12:17,220

that point because you don't want to get

280

00:12:23,210 --> 00:12:21,000

too far into to a scam with somebody and

281

00:12:25,069 --> 00:12:23,220

have them pull out you want to you want

282

00:12:27,889 --> 00:12:25,079

to make sure that there's like a big

283

00:12:30,530 --> 00:12:27,899

dumb barrier right at the outset

284

00:12:32,990 --> 00:12:30,540

um and so they're going for it you're

285

00:12:37,250 --> 00:12:33,000

probably good sealed the deal right

286

00:12:38,930 --> 00:12:37,260

right yeah yeah the ice cream bit I'm

287

00:12:40,190 --> 00:12:38,940

gonna go for the ice cream bit right

288

00:12:41,810 --> 00:12:40,200

yeah

289

00:12:45,110 --> 00:12:41,820

Sky's your limit

290

00:12:47,269 --> 00:12:45,120

yeah water lily says that in the chat

291

00:12:49,329 --> 00:12:47,279

that ice cream is a weakness uh for

292

00:12:53,690 --> 00:12:49,339

water will Ellie and well yeah

293

00:12:56,150 --> 00:12:53,700

yeah yeah eb1 that's right but um yeah

294

00:12:57,710 --> 00:12:56,160

it's it's a fascinating thing and you

295

00:13:00,230 --> 00:12:57,720

know there's there's a lot of that

296

00:13:03,050 --> 00:13:00,240

within this I mean another aspect of

297

00:13:04,730 --> 00:13:03,060

that within this community that it

298

00:13:08,690 --> 00:13:04,740

deserves being talked about it's the

299

00:13:13,670 --> 00:13:10,910

um certain pieces of information just to

300

00:13:15,949 --> 00:13:13,680

see where it travels and this is

301
00:13:18,710 --> 00:13:15,959
something that certain people do and has

302
00:13:20,329 --> 00:13:18,720
been noted to happen where you'll hear

303
00:13:22,550 --> 00:13:20,339
about a case all of a sudden that's kind

304
00:13:24,470 --> 00:13:22,560
of buried you know in the archives or

305
00:13:26,930 --> 00:13:24,480
whatever and somebody will say like oh

306
00:13:29,150 --> 00:13:26,940
you know what I heard I heard that yada

307
00:13:31,250 --> 00:13:29,160
yada yada case back in blah blah I heard

308
00:13:32,629 --> 00:13:31,260
that was legit or people will give you a

309
00:13:34,670 --> 00:13:32,639
specific number or something like that

310
00:13:37,129 --> 00:13:34,680
they'll say like I heard that there are

311
00:13:40,069 --> 00:13:37,139
23 whistleblowers that are going to be

312
00:13:42,590 --> 00:13:40,079
coming out this year 23. and then you

313
00:13:45,410 --> 00:13:42,600

know maybe some of those people are

314

00:13:46,970 --> 00:13:45,420

actually tasked you know they send out a

315

00:13:49,190 --> 00:13:46,980

specific number so that then they can

316

00:13:51,470 --> 00:13:49,200

hear who else you know says the number

317

00:13:54,910 --> 00:13:51,480

23 and parrots that later on because

318

00:13:58,970 --> 00:13:54,920

then they can figure out the the traffic

319

00:14:01,310 --> 00:13:58,980

analysis of of where you know where

320

00:14:03,650 --> 00:14:01,320

where leaks are happening or where

321

00:14:05,690 --> 00:14:03,660

information travels you know this is a

322

00:14:09,650 --> 00:14:05,700

very common strategy and people employ

323

00:14:14,389 --> 00:14:09,660

it all the time for I hope you tell me

324

00:14:21,470 --> 00:14:17,569

yeah that's uh it's just it's just too

325

00:14:25,009 --> 00:14:21,480

bad because I mean I've I follow

326

00:14:26,150 --> 00:14:25,019

that guy uh daddy like recently I've

327

00:14:28,310 --> 00:14:26,160

just been

328

00:14:31,610 --> 00:14:28,320

um I've listened back to it to a few

329

00:14:34,430 --> 00:14:31,620

Coast to Coast episodes from like 2000 I

330

00:14:36,610 --> 00:14:34,440

might get the dates wrong but 2006 or

331

00:14:40,189 --> 00:14:36,620

seven or eight or nine or whatever

332

00:14:42,769 --> 00:14:40,199

around that area and

333

00:14:44,400 --> 00:14:42,779

you know you you listen to those with

334

00:14:44,810 --> 00:14:44,410

daddy or there was this other guy

335

00:14:45,769 --> 00:14:44,820

[Music]

336

00:14:51,650 --> 00:14:45,779

um

337

00:14:55,550 --> 00:14:53,210

you know all the things you're talking

338

00:14:57,650 --> 00:14:55,560

about like uh project serpo

339

00:14:59,750 --> 00:14:57,660

which was this thing that came out where

340

00:15:02,269 --> 00:14:59,760

there is this Exchange program between

341

00:15:03,650 --> 00:15:02,279

aliens and astronauts and I'm pretty

342

00:15:05,569 --> 00:15:03,660

sure

343

00:15:07,430 --> 00:15:05,579

I was able to figure out that Dottie was

344

00:15:09,470 --> 00:15:07,440

the source for that

345

00:15:12,170 --> 00:15:09,480

uh what she denies

346

00:15:14,509 --> 00:15:12,180

but he's called Falcon and was part of

347

00:15:16,910 --> 00:15:14,519

like the Aviary or whatever and in one

348

00:15:19,009 --> 00:15:16,920

interview I thought he wasn't on it was

349

00:15:21,170 --> 00:15:19,019

said that Falcon was the anonymous

350

00:15:22,850 --> 00:15:21,180

source for the Surplus stuff so you're

351
00:15:25,790 --> 00:15:22,860
able to put this together because I feel

352
00:15:27,410 --> 00:15:25,800
like some of these people didn't realize

353
00:15:28,060 --> 00:15:27,420
that this media is going to stay around

354
00:15:31,009 --> 00:15:28,070
forever

355
00:15:34,490 --> 00:15:31,019
[Laughter]

356
00:15:36,290 --> 00:15:34,500
interviews and these these other things

357
00:15:38,569 --> 00:15:36,300
that happen are going to be around for a

358
00:15:40,069 --> 00:15:38,579
while and so people can go back and kind

359
00:15:43,129 --> 00:15:40,079
of look at that stuff

360
00:15:44,930 --> 00:15:43,139
so that and then there's like the

361
00:15:46,990 --> 00:15:44,940
Roswell thing all of a sudden became

362
00:15:50,150 --> 00:15:47,000
kind of uh shaky to me because

363
00:15:53,210 --> 00:15:50,160

apparently well I learned that the

364

00:15:55,250 --> 00:15:53,220

reason for Roswell kind of coming back

365

00:15:56,629 --> 00:15:55,260

into the foreground was because of Bill

366

00:16:00,050 --> 00:15:56,639

Moore

367

00:16:01,310 --> 00:16:00,060

really and he wrote the first book on

368

00:16:04,490 --> 00:16:01,320

Roswell

369

00:16:07,069 --> 00:16:04,500

and Bill Moore

370

00:16:09,410 --> 00:16:07,079

Bill Moore was

371

00:16:11,689 --> 00:16:09,420

a guy who was into UFOs went to these

372

00:16:13,430 --> 00:16:11,699

UFO conventions there was this move-on

373

00:16:15,110 --> 00:16:13,440

convention and I forget what the day was

374

00:16:17,569 --> 00:16:15,120

it was a while ago now but he came out

375

00:16:19,670 --> 00:16:17,579

and admitted that he was peddling

376

00:16:21,170 --> 00:16:19,680

misinformation and he was like an

377

00:16:24,650 --> 00:16:21,180

informant

378

00:16:26,269 --> 00:16:24,660

that's right that's right yeah so then

379

00:16:28,490 --> 00:16:26,279

that kind of brings everything into

380

00:16:31,370 --> 00:16:28,500

question if that's the case and this guy

381

00:16:34,009 --> 00:16:31,380

wrote the first book on Roswell like and

382

00:16:37,389 --> 00:16:34,019

he was friends with Dottie those two so

383

00:16:40,370 --> 00:16:37,399

what what is real

384

00:16:41,870 --> 00:16:40,380

right you know and for those and for

385

00:16:44,930 --> 00:16:41,880

those that are interested

386

00:16:46,189 --> 00:16:44,940

um uh in the chat or watching this in

387

00:16:49,129 --> 00:16:46,199

the future

388

00:16:51,230 --> 00:16:49,139

um that case the bill Moore case is also

389

00:16:53,090 --> 00:16:51,240

written about in Project beta Greg

390

00:16:55,490 --> 00:16:53,100

Bishop's really great book on

391

00:16:58,370 --> 00:16:55,500

misinformation and disinformation

392

00:17:00,590 --> 00:16:58,380

um so uh please if you want a thorough

393

00:17:02,150 --> 00:17:00,600

accounting of that uh go to Greg's

394

00:17:03,410 --> 00:17:02,160

really great book it's highly

395

00:17:05,210 --> 00:17:03,420

recommended

396

00:17:08,809 --> 00:17:05,220

um but yeah you're absolutely you're

397

00:17:12,049 --> 00:17:08,819

absolutely 100 right and you know

398

00:17:14,270 --> 00:17:12,059

I mean on the one hand those are those

399

00:17:16,069 --> 00:17:14,280

are a finite amount of cases however

400

00:17:18,890 --> 00:17:16,079

those are the cases that we know about

401
00:17:21,230 --> 00:17:18,900
right right and so how many other people

402
00:17:24,230 --> 00:17:21,240
out there and I think that that's one

403
00:17:27,949 --> 00:17:24,240
thing that that you know is consistently

404
00:17:29,930 --> 00:17:27,959
challenging for so many people within

405
00:17:32,030 --> 00:17:29,940
the community that the more that they

406
00:17:34,490 --> 00:17:32,040
hear the lore and then they find lore

407
00:17:36,650 --> 00:17:34,500
that they like you know what I mean and

408
00:17:40,130 --> 00:17:36,660
people find lore that they like and then

409
00:17:43,130 --> 00:17:40,140
it's hard to and then that kind of like

410
00:17:46,130 --> 00:17:43,140
it it's a tether there's a tether there

411
00:17:47,930 --> 00:17:46,140
and it it it kind of you know anchors

412
00:17:50,630 --> 00:17:47,940
into your brain and then you think you

413
00:17:52,909 --> 00:17:50,640

hear other options you you kind of move

414

00:17:55,669 --> 00:17:52,919

through all these spaces it's easy to

415

00:17:57,289 --> 00:17:55,679

understand why people will go get into

416

00:17:59,330 --> 00:17:57,299

this community walk in the door and be

417

00:18:01,310 --> 00:17:59,340

like oh cool all this weird weird stuff

418

00:18:03,650 --> 00:18:01,320

and there's there's awesome craft and

419

00:18:05,510 --> 00:18:03,660

they go over here and they go wow you

420

00:18:07,610 --> 00:18:05,520

know and there's beings and there's this

421

00:18:09,710 --> 00:18:07,620

and there's bodies and there's crashes

422

00:18:11,330 --> 00:18:09,720

and there's Intrigue and all this stuff

423

00:18:13,970 --> 00:18:11,340

and then after a while they're like oh

424

00:18:16,730 --> 00:18:13,980

my God you know there's all these lies

425

00:18:20,270 --> 00:18:16,740

and there and there's there's almost

426

00:18:22,970 --> 00:18:20,280

always like a process of intrigue and

427

00:18:25,190 --> 00:18:22,980

Fascination and then disillusion and

428

00:18:27,650 --> 00:18:25,200

then kind of rebuilding that happens

429

00:18:30,470 --> 00:18:27,660

with people that that are in this

430

00:18:33,470 --> 00:18:30,480

community for or are interested in this

431

00:18:36,110 --> 00:18:33,480

topic in general for for a while and dig

432

00:18:38,930 --> 00:18:36,120

deep like it's it's almost

433

00:18:40,430 --> 00:18:38,940

it's it's almost unavoidable if you're

434

00:18:42,650 --> 00:18:40,440

really thinking critically and looking

435

00:18:44,870 --> 00:18:42,660

at it at an analytic level and I think

436

00:18:46,850 --> 00:18:44,880

that that's one thing that that people

437

00:18:48,710 --> 00:18:46,860

sometimes don't appreciate from the

438

00:18:51,529 --> 00:18:48,720

skeptical side of things because a lot

439

00:18:55,130 --> 00:18:51,539

of the people in the skeptical side of

440

00:18:58,250 --> 00:18:55,140

the UFO UAP commit Community don't

441

00:19:01,010 --> 00:18:58,260

appreciate that those that are really in

442

00:19:03,409 --> 00:19:01,020

it like also have gone through their

443

00:19:05,330 --> 00:19:03,419

period of disillusionment and just went

444

00:19:07,450 --> 00:19:05,340

through a rebuilding process you know

445

00:19:10,850 --> 00:19:07,460

what I mean like a lot of the Skeptics

446

00:19:12,770 --> 00:19:10,860

assume that there was never a period of

447

00:19:14,150 --> 00:19:12,780

disillusionment which could that you

448

00:19:16,130 --> 00:19:14,160

know that couldn't be further than the

449

00:19:18,770 --> 00:19:16,140

truth for most people if you actually

450

00:19:21,350 --> 00:19:18,780

talk to them sure yeah I mean I know

451

00:19:23,450 --> 00:19:21,360

just for myself like because you read

452

00:19:27,289 --> 00:19:23,460

like the official Air Force cases so

453

00:19:30,529 --> 00:19:27,299

like and I and I've had my own thing so

454

00:19:32,450 --> 00:19:30,539

I know there's something you know and so

455

00:19:34,730 --> 00:19:32,460

you want to go look for more and you go

456

00:19:37,370 --> 00:19:34,740

in these other directions and everyone

457

00:19:39,650 --> 00:19:37,380

is offering more trust me there's so

458

00:19:41,930 --> 00:19:39,660

many people that offer you more on what

459

00:19:44,690 --> 00:19:41,940

they think UAP is or whatever there's so

460

00:19:47,330 --> 00:19:44,700

many different directions to go and you

461

00:19:49,789 --> 00:19:47,340

know you go down one and you know you

462

00:19:51,310 --> 00:19:49,799

realize it's just

463

00:19:53,450 --> 00:19:51,320

there's a trap

464

00:19:56,630 --> 00:19:53,460

you know and there's and there's nothing

465

00:19:58,190 --> 00:19:56,640

there or for whatever reason there's

466

00:20:00,049 --> 00:19:58,200

this or that you know and it can get

467

00:20:02,150 --> 00:20:00,059

quite frustrating so you get kind of

468

00:20:04,909 --> 00:20:02,160

like well I'm over this I'm done with it

469

00:20:07,370 --> 00:20:04,919

you know but in the end you know that

470

00:20:10,669 --> 00:20:07,380

there's something in there

471

00:20:11,690 --> 00:20:10,679

yeah and that's that's kind of you know

472

00:20:14,810 --> 00:20:11,700

my

473

00:20:16,669 --> 00:20:14,820

the ground I stand on you know I I know

474

00:20:18,470 --> 00:20:16,679

that there's there's something there but

475

00:20:20,870 --> 00:20:18,480

it's it's just unfortunate that people

476
00:20:24,350 --> 00:20:20,880
kind of try to throw so much trash and

477
00:20:26,270 --> 00:20:24,360
garbage in the area to kind of

478
00:20:28,850 --> 00:20:26,280
just muck it up to make it almost

479
00:20:32,930 --> 00:20:28,860
impossible to find something you know

480
00:20:35,570 --> 00:20:32,940
real so yeah and but I mean you can it

481
00:20:38,150 --> 00:20:35,580
just take it just takes time you know it

482
00:20:39,610 --> 00:20:38,160
does it does and I think I mean I think

483
00:20:43,190 --> 00:20:39,620
one of the issues

484
00:20:45,650 --> 00:20:43,200
right you have to be like just because

485
00:20:47,750 --> 00:20:45,660
you believe that UFOs are real or

486
00:20:49,669 --> 00:20:47,760
there's something there doesn't mean

487
00:20:51,470 --> 00:20:49,679
that you're not also a skeptic you know

488
00:20:53,990 --> 00:20:51,480

kind of going on what you were saying

489

00:20:57,590 --> 00:20:54,000

like we still have to play this game of

490

00:20:59,870 --> 00:20:57,600

who's full of crap and who isn't yeah or

491

00:21:01,370 --> 00:20:59,880

or I mean I think that you know like

492

00:21:02,750 --> 00:21:01,380

people like Mitch Horowitz have been

493

00:21:05,870 --> 00:21:02,760

have said lately and things like that

494

00:21:09,909 --> 00:21:05,880

that there's that I think a problem with

495

00:21:12,830 --> 00:21:09,919

the term skeptic has been that that

496

00:21:16,010 --> 00:21:12,840

unfortunately a lot of people that act

497

00:21:18,890 --> 00:21:16,020

in bad faith in our community adopt the

498

00:21:21,049 --> 00:21:18,900

term skeptic when in fact they just want

499

00:21:23,390 --> 00:21:21,059

to throw out barriers they're not honest

500

00:21:25,610 --> 00:21:23,400

Skeptics they're actually bad faith

501
00:21:27,289 --> 00:21:25,620
Skeptics and there's a difference and we

502
00:21:29,690 --> 00:21:27,299
and we have to really think about it

503
00:21:31,370 --> 00:21:29,700
they're yeah yeah you get trolls you get

504
00:21:34,370 --> 00:21:31,380
bullies and people say well I'm just

505
00:21:36,169 --> 00:21:34,380
skeptical I'm skeptical or I I just want

506
00:21:38,029 --> 00:21:36,179
to see the evidence and and then they

507
00:21:41,450 --> 00:21:38,039
throw up strawman or whatever but like

508
00:21:44,210 --> 00:21:41,460
beyond that I I you know there's also

509
00:21:47,570 --> 00:21:44,220
the issue of you know open-mindedness

510
00:21:49,789 --> 00:21:47,580
versus skepticism and I think or you

511
00:21:53,570 --> 00:21:49,799
know looking at things with a critical

512
00:21:55,909 --> 00:21:53,580
eye and and that you know I don't

513
00:21:59,029 --> 00:21:55,919

personally think of myself as a skeptic

514

00:22:01,310 --> 00:21:59,039

about the UAP topic but I do think about

515

00:22:04,190 --> 00:22:01,320

my myself as a skeptic of certain

516

00:22:07,490 --> 00:22:04,200

figures within you volunteers exactly or

517

00:22:10,990 --> 00:22:07,500

theories or ideas of it you know so

518

00:22:14,450 --> 00:22:11,000

you're you're a skeptic Within

519

00:22:15,710 --> 00:22:14,460

belief basically right you know like it

520

00:22:17,570 --> 00:22:15,720

doesn't mean that you just believe

521

00:22:19,190 --> 00:22:17,580

everything you know you know you're

522

00:22:21,289 --> 00:22:19,200

still skeptical of all the different

523

00:22:23,330 --> 00:22:21,299

things and and you know whether it be

524

00:22:25,010 --> 00:22:23,340

books or ideas people try to sell you or

525

00:22:28,430 --> 00:22:25,020

whether it's Dodie or Stephen Grier

526

00:22:31,130 --> 00:22:28,440

you're still skeptical of that you know

527

00:22:32,810 --> 00:22:31,140

right and you still have and in in many

528

00:22:34,490 --> 00:22:32,820

ways it's more difficult

529

00:22:35,870 --> 00:22:34,500

because you're not making this simple

530

00:22:38,149 --> 00:22:35,880

choice of

531

00:22:42,710 --> 00:22:38,159

is it real or not

532

00:22:44,570 --> 00:22:42,720

you know right yes it's real but now

533

00:22:46,850 --> 00:22:44,580

the universe

534

00:22:49,970 --> 00:22:46,860

ex that Universe expands because now

535

00:22:52,130 --> 00:22:49,980

it's like what is it you know and

536

00:22:54,169 --> 00:22:52,140

everybody has their different idea of of

537

00:22:57,110 --> 00:22:54,179

what it is and

538

00:23:00,950 --> 00:22:57,120

you know and it can be expensive you

539

00:23:03,230 --> 00:23:00,960

know you've got books time right all

540

00:23:05,930 --> 00:23:03,240

sorts well there's there yeah it's

541

00:23:08,149 --> 00:23:05,940

expensive and it's expansive it expands

542

00:23:10,370 --> 00:23:08,159

like like no matter where you go into

543

00:23:13,070 --> 00:23:10,380

this field it's going to it's going to

544

00:23:15,230 --> 00:23:13,080

radiate into so many other areas and so

545

00:23:16,430 --> 00:23:15,240

you know that that can be another point

546

00:23:17,750 --> 00:23:16,440

where people throw out their hands and

547

00:23:20,690 --> 00:23:17,760

at the same time you know the people

548

00:23:22,930 --> 00:23:20,700

that really Thrive you know in being

549

00:23:25,970 --> 00:23:22,940

invested in this topic are the people

550

00:23:28,970 --> 00:23:25,980

that will could look at a topic maybe

551

00:23:30,289 --> 00:23:28,980

like like um materialism and

552

00:23:32,630 --> 00:23:30,299

Consciousness and things like that and

553

00:23:34,730 --> 00:23:32,640

be like oh maybe space time isn't

554

00:23:36,529 --> 00:23:34,740

fundamental you know what I mean or you

555

00:23:38,990 --> 00:23:36,539

know or maybe physicality isn't

556

00:23:41,390 --> 00:23:39,000

fundamental and there's some truth that

557

00:23:44,390 --> 00:23:41,400

you can hang on to yeah yeah and then

558

00:23:46,610 --> 00:23:44,400

and then you know if if you can if you

559

00:23:49,970 --> 00:23:46,620

can kind of stand on those Sandy Shores

560

00:23:53,090 --> 00:23:49,980

of of topics like that and and and kind

561

00:23:55,730 --> 00:23:53,100

of be you know and and that that really

562

00:23:57,950 --> 00:23:55,740

inspires you to think harder you know

563

00:24:00,049 --> 00:23:57,960

what I mean and if that inspires you and

564

00:24:02,149 --> 00:24:00,059

and makes you excited you know what I

565

00:24:04,130 --> 00:24:02,159

mean if that Thrills you then you know

566

00:24:06,830 --> 00:24:04,140

that's a good you know that's a good

567

00:24:08,810 --> 00:24:06,840

indicator that that you could be in this

568

00:24:10,190 --> 00:24:08,820

community for quite a long time you know

569

00:24:11,870 --> 00:24:10,200

what I mean or you could be interested

570

00:24:13,789 --> 00:24:11,880

in these topics for quite a long time

571

00:24:15,890 --> 00:24:13,799

anyway we've talked about this before

572

00:24:18,470 --> 00:24:15,900

too but it's it's

573

00:24:21,409 --> 00:24:18,480

um like the the search for you know

574

00:24:22,130 --> 00:24:21,419

whatever meaning or whatever it could be

575

00:24:24,950 --> 00:24:22,140

um

576

00:24:29,149 --> 00:24:24,960

in the midst of of doing that you learn

577

00:24:31,250 --> 00:24:29,159

about so many other types of things you

578

00:24:32,230 --> 00:24:31,260

know that you would never think you

579

00:24:34,430 --> 00:24:32,240

would

580

00:24:36,350 --> 00:24:34,440

learn about and you don't even think

581

00:24:37,789 --> 00:24:36,360

about it you're just like all of a

582

00:24:41,029 --> 00:24:37,799

sudden I know about like classic

583

00:24:43,490 --> 00:24:41,039

airplanes and stuff you know like

584

00:24:46,730 --> 00:24:43,500

in in the kind of radar systems they

585

00:24:49,549 --> 00:24:46,740

used in the 50s you know like why would

586

00:24:51,409 --> 00:24:49,559

I ever know that you know right yeah so

587

00:24:52,909 --> 00:24:51,419

like I'm I'm somewhat familiar with

588

00:24:55,430 --> 00:24:52,919

those and you know all the different

589

00:24:57,289 --> 00:24:55,440

things Radars can pick up and stuff and

590

00:24:58,970 --> 00:24:57,299

it's not because I had an interest in

591

00:25:01,669 --> 00:24:58,980

that it was because I had an interest in

592

00:25:03,950 --> 00:25:01,679

UFOs I wanted to go look at the cases

593

00:25:05,870 --> 00:25:03,960

and when you look at the cases and

594

00:25:07,789 --> 00:25:05,880

there's a radar visual case you know

595

00:25:11,630 --> 00:25:07,799

you're like well what kind of radar is

596

00:25:13,430 --> 00:25:11,640

that you know is it possible to have

597

00:25:16,789 --> 00:25:13,440

anomalous propagation or what's the deal

598

00:25:19,010 --> 00:25:16,799

so now you got to research the radar

599

00:25:20,510 --> 00:25:19,020

and by the end of it you're like I have

600

00:25:23,690 --> 00:25:20,520

all this information that's kind of

601
00:25:25,610 --> 00:25:23,700
useless but no it's great and it takes

602
00:25:27,289 --> 00:25:25,620
all kinds right it's important to have

603
00:25:29,630 --> 00:25:27,299
all these different pieces of the puzzle

604
00:25:32,330 --> 00:25:29,640
because you know as we've said before

605
00:25:34,250 --> 00:25:32,340
you you are a little bit more

606
00:25:36,110 --> 00:25:34,260
skeptically minded or kind of a little

607
00:25:38,630 --> 00:25:36,120
bit more conservative and in your

608
00:25:41,630 --> 00:25:38,640
thinking in terms of this topic than I

609
00:25:43,310 --> 00:25:41,640
am and partially just because you know

610
00:25:44,750 --> 00:25:43,320
the the circles that I'm in partially

611
00:25:48,289 --> 00:25:44,760
because of my own personal experiences

612
00:25:50,330 --> 00:25:48,299
and things like that I I'm I'm a little

613
00:25:52,610 --> 00:25:50,340

I'm more at the deep end of the swimming

614

00:25:55,250 --> 00:25:52,620

pool let's put it that way right and at

615

00:25:57,470 --> 00:25:55,260

the same time you know like I

616

00:25:59,870 --> 00:25:57,480

you know people in the deep end of the

617

00:26:01,310 --> 00:25:59,880

swimming pool still need to still every

618

00:26:03,230 --> 00:26:01,320

once in a while you need to touch the

619

00:26:04,669 --> 00:26:03,240

bottom any or you need to get to the

620

00:26:07,850 --> 00:26:04,679

side of the pool right it's important

621

00:26:09,710 --> 00:26:07,860

it's incredibly important and so and and

622

00:26:13,070 --> 00:26:09,720

it's I think that one of the reasons why

623

00:26:15,529 --> 00:26:13,080

those like folks like me appreciate you

624

00:26:17,810 --> 00:26:15,539

know can appreciate you know the more

625

00:26:20,210 --> 00:26:17,820

grounded the much more grounded side of

626

00:26:22,850 --> 00:26:20,220

things is that it's absolutely it's it's

627

00:26:25,190 --> 00:26:22,860

necessary for the conversation overall

628

00:26:26,510 --> 00:26:25,200

out in the public consensus out in the

629

00:26:28,669 --> 00:26:26,520

public realm you know we're going to be

630

00:26:31,310 --> 00:26:28,679

talking to Tom in a few minutes here and

631

00:26:34,570 --> 00:26:31,320

you know it's it's really it's there's

632

00:26:37,130 --> 00:26:34,580

there are people these days that are

633

00:26:39,350 --> 00:26:37,140

that are you know really bent on trying

634

00:26:41,990 --> 00:26:39,360

to figure out a way to communicate this

635

00:26:43,850 --> 00:26:42,000

to a much much larger audience in a way

636

00:26:46,190 --> 00:26:43,860

that makes sense and it's and it can be

637

00:26:48,110 --> 00:26:46,200

challenging because you know there are

638

00:26:50,870 --> 00:26:48,120

there are people that just want it to be

639

00:26:52,490 --> 00:26:50,880

you know spaceships you know from other

640

00:26:54,169 --> 00:26:52,500

planets and then there are people like

641

00:26:56,149 --> 00:26:54,179

Jacque Valley

642

00:26:58,070 --> 00:26:56,159

um you know who who say that if it's

643

00:26:59,870 --> 00:26:58,080

only you know beings coming here from

644

00:27:02,210 --> 00:26:59,880

other planets he's going to appointed

645

00:27:04,250 --> 00:27:02,220

you know what I mean and it just it's

646

00:27:05,750 --> 00:27:04,260

way too easy yeah that's right and it

647

00:27:08,390 --> 00:27:05,760

goes and it goes further and further

648

00:27:11,810 --> 00:27:08,400

from there right yeah so well speaking

649

00:27:13,430 --> 00:27:11,820

of Mr Tom Rogan I just saw him pop up in

650

00:27:15,890 --> 00:27:13,440

the green room

651
00:27:19,490 --> 00:27:15,900
um do you have an introduction for uh

652
00:27:22,010 --> 00:27:19,500
sure yeah I sure do here let me pick it

653
00:27:24,350 --> 00:27:22,020
up here all right

654
00:27:26,029 --> 00:27:24,360
Tom Rogan is an online editor and

655
00:27:28,610 --> 00:27:26,039
foreign policy writer for the Washington

656
00:27:30,110 --> 00:27:28,620
examiner he writes frequently on

657
00:27:32,090 --> 00:27:30,120
security and intelligence issues

658
00:27:34,549 --> 00:27:32,100
involving Russia China and the Middle

659
00:27:36,710 --> 00:27:34,559
East he holds a Bachelor of Arts in war

660
00:27:37,909 --> 00:27:36,720
studies from King's College London a

661
00:27:41,630 --> 00:27:37,919
master of science in Middle East

662
00:27:43,669 --> 00:27:41,640
politics from soas and a graduate

663
00:27:45,890 --> 00:27:43,679

diploma in law from the University of

664

00:27:47,149 --> 00:27:45,900

law of London among others he has

665

00:27:49,970 --> 00:27:47,159

previously written for the Wall Street

666

00:27:52,310 --> 00:27:49,980

Journal The Washington Post Reuters the

667

00:27:54,830 --> 00:27:52,320

independent the Atlantic National Review

668

00:27:56,810 --> 00:27:54,840

the Telegraph and the guardian welcome

669

00:28:02,110 --> 00:27:56,820

Tom thanks good to be with you guys

670

00:28:06,409 --> 00:28:04,789

I had a one of those lights that you put

671

00:28:09,110 --> 00:28:06,419

next to you to make you but apparently

672

00:28:12,230 --> 00:28:09,120

one I think someone has moved it so I'm

673

00:28:14,810 --> 00:28:12,240

using my cell phone light I don't like

674

00:28:17,230 --> 00:28:14,820

this or like that it's either which way

675

00:28:19,370 --> 00:28:17,240

you look great both ways

676

00:28:22,190 --> 00:28:19,380

as long as I'm not screwing up your

677

00:28:24,230 --> 00:28:22,200

production oh no you look fantastic no

678

00:28:26,330 --> 00:28:24,240

you're not you know what thanks thanks

679

00:28:28,430 --> 00:28:26,340

for having me on yeah thanks thanks for

680

00:28:29,870 --> 00:28:28,440

being out I really appreciate it

681

00:28:31,970 --> 00:28:29,880

um you know we were just talking before

682

00:28:33,830 --> 00:28:31,980

you got on like the the little boogers

683

00:28:36,950 --> 00:28:33,840

in the UFO community that kind of spread

684

00:28:38,870 --> 00:28:36,960

like misinformation and such and you

685

00:28:40,789 --> 00:28:38,880

know in kind of making sure I was

686

00:28:43,430 --> 00:28:40,799

abreast of everything that you've done I

687

00:28:46,510 --> 00:28:43,440

came across uh an article you wrote

688

00:28:50,330 --> 00:28:46,520

about Stephen Greer yeah

689

00:28:52,430 --> 00:28:50,340

about the flare thing and is that where

690

00:28:54,590 --> 00:28:52,440

this story started where he you know

691

00:28:55,970 --> 00:28:54,600

flares out of a helicopter during a

692

00:28:58,549 --> 00:28:55,980

retreat can you tell me a little bit

693

00:29:00,890 --> 00:28:58,559

about that yeah so you know I had

694

00:29:03,590 --> 00:29:00,900

someone flag that for me and basically

695

00:29:06,890 --> 00:29:03,600

went through the FAA you know the you

696

00:29:08,269 --> 00:29:06,900

know the data uh and it learned strongly

697

00:29:10,730 --> 00:29:08,279

like

698

00:29:12,289 --> 00:29:10,740

um you know flares at least in this case

699

00:29:13,250 --> 00:29:12,299

were dropped out of a plane off the

700

00:29:15,649 --> 00:29:13,260

coast

701

00:29:17,269 --> 00:29:15,659

um you know paid to do that and the the

702

00:29:19,850 --> 00:29:17,279

you know managed to track down the the

703

00:29:21,950 --> 00:29:19,860

company that uh owned the plane and they

704

00:29:24,110 --> 00:29:21,960

suddenly went very quiet and didn't want

705

00:29:26,690 --> 00:29:24,120

to talk about it and you know I think

706

00:29:28,310 --> 00:29:26,700

one of the things you know I'm very

707

00:29:29,870 --> 00:29:28,320

confident in this case you know flesh

708

00:29:32,389 --> 00:29:29,880

were involved and when you look at the

709

00:29:34,669 --> 00:29:32,399

imagery you know but

710

00:29:37,250 --> 00:29:34,679

other people seem to have you know

711

00:29:39,710 --> 00:29:37,260

different views on Greer I mean I I we

712

00:29:42,350 --> 00:29:39,720

thought he's a little bit out there and

713

00:29:44,450 --> 00:29:42,360

you know but perhaps in a different vein

714

00:29:47,750 --> 00:29:44,460

to to the subject matter that I'm

715

00:29:49,789 --> 00:29:47,760

interested in but what I think motivated

716

00:29:53,570 --> 00:29:49,799

me particularly to write that piece was

717

00:29:55,250 --> 00:29:53,580

the concern that if you truly do believe

718

00:29:57,169 --> 00:29:55,260

um as he would purport to believe that

719

00:30:00,470 --> 00:29:57,179

he is you know doing something

720

00:30:02,510 --> 00:30:00,480

extraordinary why would you you

721

00:30:05,750 --> 00:30:02,520

jeopardize all that

722

00:30:08,630 --> 00:30:05,760

um with this kind of uh Antics and you

723

00:30:10,190 --> 00:30:08,640

know and it plays very I think the

724

00:30:12,769 --> 00:30:10,200

frustration for me probably for for

725

00:30:15,169 --> 00:30:12,779

other people is that when people engage

726

00:30:16,850 --> 00:30:15,179

in things like that it dilutes not

727

00:30:18,409 --> 00:30:16,860

simply their own credibility but the

728

00:30:20,930 --> 00:30:18,419

broader credibility of the entire field

729

00:30:21,830 --> 00:30:20,940

and in journalism you know that that's

730

00:30:23,690 --> 00:30:21,840

it

731

00:30:24,950 --> 00:30:23,700

I think we have to kind of cover stories

732

00:30:27,409 --> 00:30:24,960

like that because you know it's

733

00:30:31,070 --> 00:30:27,419

legitimate and it's quite frankly you

734

00:30:33,590 --> 00:30:31,080

know not terribly honest but it also is

735

00:30:34,909 --> 00:30:33,600

frustrating because you know as I'm sure

736

00:30:37,610 --> 00:30:34,919

you agree there's a lot going on here

737

00:30:40,310 --> 00:30:37,620

that is extraordinary and when you know

738

00:30:42,470 --> 00:30:40,320

when it's diluted in any way it it harms

739

00:30:45,409 --> 00:30:42,480

the entire Enterprise

740

00:30:47,570 --> 00:30:45,419

absolutely I mean it it really it's it's

741

00:30:51,049 --> 00:30:47,580

a shame because it really

742

00:30:52,909 --> 00:30:51,059

it it really clouds and muddies the

743

00:30:55,070 --> 00:30:52,919

waters because when you look back at say

744

00:30:57,230 --> 00:30:55,080

what he did with like the the national

745

00:30:59,090 --> 00:30:57,240

Press Club hearings in 2001 or something

746

00:31:00,950 --> 00:30:59,100

like that there it did seem like that

747

00:31:02,870 --> 00:31:00,960

there was a real that there was a there

748

00:31:04,430 --> 00:31:02,880

there you know what I mean that there he

749

00:31:06,110 --> 00:31:04,440

had he was able to bring in a lot of

750

00:31:08,149 --> 00:31:06,120

people on the record

751

00:31:09,710 --> 00:31:08,159

um that were from the FAA or from the

752

00:31:13,070 --> 00:31:09,720

military and things like that and that

753

00:31:14,450 --> 00:31:13,080

was and it seemed you know like looking

754

00:31:16,070 --> 00:31:14,460

back on that that was kind of a

755

00:31:19,430 --> 00:31:16,080

historical moment within the community

756

00:31:21,230 --> 00:31:19,440

in a larger way and you know and the

757

00:31:24,049 --> 00:31:21,240

timing was terrible obviously and things

758

00:31:26,690 --> 00:31:24,059

like that and it's a shame that

759

00:31:28,970 --> 00:31:26,700

the the situation that

760

00:31:30,470 --> 00:31:28,980

the guy's just gone so far of course I

761

00:31:33,110 --> 00:31:30,480

mean to be perfectly Frank from my

762

00:31:36,169 --> 00:31:33,120

perspective but yeah but but as you say

763

00:31:38,990 --> 00:31:36,179

you know that he did you know give him

764

00:31:41,810 --> 00:31:39,000

um his duties for those early events

765

00:31:43,310 --> 00:31:41,820

yeah right um so to talk about some of

766

00:31:45,830 --> 00:31:43,320

your latest work actually and we talked

767

00:31:49,310 --> 00:31:45,840

about this on the show last week um it

768

00:31:51,470 --> 00:31:49,320

was your uh recent piece about some

769

00:31:54,529 --> 00:31:51,480

unidentified sightings over Lawrence

770

00:31:56,990 --> 00:31:54,539

Livermore laboratory where that giant

771

00:31:58,730 --> 00:31:57,000

Fusion uh experiment was was just

772

00:32:00,289 --> 00:31:58,740

unveiled not too long ago where that's

773

00:32:02,389 --> 00:32:00,299

where that happened

774

00:32:04,850 --> 00:32:02,399

um in reading through you know your

775

00:32:09,169 --> 00:32:04,860

piece on it it seems kind of like some

776

00:32:11,510 --> 00:32:09,179

may have been drones maybe one was

777

00:32:13,730 --> 00:32:11,520

um you know not obviously a drone it was

778

00:32:15,950 --> 00:32:13,740

kind of like a silver circular

779

00:32:18,289 --> 00:32:15,960

sphere-ish kind of thing but it was

780

00:32:20,810 --> 00:32:18,299

quite high and and hard to kind of tell

781

00:32:22,850 --> 00:32:20,820

what it was can you maybe just run

782

00:32:24,350 --> 00:32:22,860

through that piece a little bit for some

783

00:32:25,909 --> 00:32:24,360

what your thoughts are and if you think

784

00:32:27,289 --> 00:32:25,919

things are really drones or are they

785

00:32:28,909 --> 00:32:27,299

just using these words because they

786

00:32:31,430 --> 00:32:28,919

don't know what else to say you know

787

00:32:33,950 --> 00:32:31,440

that sort of thing well yeah I mean I I

788

00:32:35,570 --> 00:32:33,960

did um you know Freedom of Information

789

00:32:37,130 --> 00:32:35,580

Act requests

790

00:32:39,110 --> 00:32:37,140

um you know I have some others

791

00:32:41,330 --> 00:32:39,120

outstanding but I think you know high

792

00:32:44,269 --> 00:32:41,340

technology or uh cutting-ed research

793

00:32:47,029 --> 00:32:44,279

military or scientific sites uh

794

00:32:49,490 --> 00:32:47,039

certainly nuclear uh sites

795

00:32:51,049 --> 00:32:49,500

um you know obviously do have a

796

00:32:53,930 --> 00:32:51,059

connection Point

797

00:32:55,310 --> 00:32:53,940

um or I I it is it's my uh understanding

798

00:32:57,830 --> 00:32:55,320

that they have a connection point with

799

00:32:59,810 --> 00:32:57,840

you know the broader let's see more

800

00:33:01,070 --> 00:32:59,820

extraordinary elements of this issue of

801
00:33:02,029 --> 00:33:01,080
the phenomenon whatever you want to call

802
00:33:04,310 --> 00:33:02,039
it

803
00:33:06,230 --> 00:33:04,320
um so did those requests the returns I

804
00:33:08,990 --> 00:33:06,240
got back were the you know ones I I

805
00:33:11,990 --> 00:33:09,000
wrote about there and I think

806
00:33:15,409 --> 00:33:12,000
um you know the the the top lines are

807
00:33:17,210 --> 00:33:15,419
that that clearly in in these cases you

808
00:33:19,730 --> 00:33:17,220
know the security

809
00:33:21,529 --> 00:33:19,740
um offices there and you know the

810
00:33:23,990 --> 00:33:21,539
management were not able to get to the

811
00:33:25,970 --> 00:33:24,000
bottom of what was going on uh at least

812
00:33:27,289 --> 00:33:25,980
in the first instance

813
00:33:29,090 --> 00:33:27,299

um and I have no reason to believe

814

00:33:31,310 --> 00:33:29,100

they've got to the bottom of what was

815

00:33:33,470 --> 00:33:31,320

going on further down the road and stuff

816

00:33:34,430 --> 00:33:33,480

that wouldn't have to be available for

817

00:33:36,590 --> 00:33:34,440

it

818

00:33:39,289 --> 00:33:36,600

um and you know whether that's

819

00:33:40,669 --> 00:33:39,299

um you know someone you know because of

820

00:33:43,310 --> 00:33:40,679

the location of some of these places

821

00:33:44,990 --> 00:33:43,320

it's it's hard to think you know that it

822

00:33:46,310 --> 00:33:45,000

is just some random person and the

823

00:33:48,710 --> 00:33:46,320

timing

824

00:33:50,810 --> 00:33:48,720

um you know it could be

825

00:33:52,370 --> 00:33:50,820

um but certainly there would be a

826

00:33:54,590 --> 00:33:52,380

foreign intelligence concern that you

827

00:33:56,870 --> 00:33:54,600

know the FBI would take seriously again

828

00:33:59,090 --> 00:33:56,880

I don't know whether the FBI did for

829

00:34:01,669 --> 00:33:59,100

other investigation I do know that they

830

00:34:04,610 --> 00:34:01,679

do investigate intrusions at nuclear

831

00:34:06,889 --> 00:34:04,620

sites where there's reports sometimes

832

00:34:08,869 --> 00:34:06,899

um and local field offices take that on

833

00:34:10,129 --> 00:34:08,879

for obvious reasons that you want to

834

00:34:12,530 --> 00:34:10,139

know if someone's messing around with

835

00:34:14,990 --> 00:34:12,540

nuclear facilities

836

00:34:16,790 --> 00:34:15,000

um but you know I did think it was

837

00:34:20,450 --> 00:34:16,800

striking the description of that one

838

00:34:22,369 --> 00:34:20,460

silver circular uh object and you know

839

00:34:25,849 --> 00:34:22,379

the way that it had been described to be

840

00:34:28,730 --> 00:34:25,859

loitering and hard to characterize and

841

00:34:29,629 --> 00:34:28,740

there certainly is an impetus to in the

842

00:34:32,210 --> 00:34:29,639

government

843

00:34:35,629 --> 00:34:32,220

um to identify things as drones as far

844

00:34:37,490 --> 00:34:35,639

as is possible to try and avoid you know

845

00:34:41,510 --> 00:34:37,500

dealing with you know more difficult

846

00:34:42,050 --> 00:34:41,520

questions but you know as as you know

847

00:34:44,030 --> 00:34:42,060

um

848

00:34:46,310 --> 00:34:44,040

I think it's Adam Kehoe you know to this

849

00:34:48,889 --> 00:34:46,320

piece of the drive on on drones off the

850

00:34:50,750 --> 00:34:48,899

West Coast there is a concern with you

851
00:34:53,089 --> 00:34:50,760
know very capable foreign State actors

852
00:34:55,010 --> 00:34:53,099
the Chinese I think in that case

853
00:34:57,349 --> 00:34:55,020
um operating drones in quite clever

854
00:35:01,790 --> 00:34:57,359
Boutique ways as intelligence collection

855
00:35:04,250 --> 00:35:01,800
platforms and so you know we do need to

856
00:35:05,930 --> 00:35:04,260
um you know be careful but but what I

857
00:35:08,030 --> 00:35:05,940
would say is

858
00:35:09,710 --> 00:35:08,040
um you can have both things going on at

859
00:35:11,870 --> 00:35:09,720
the same time right the problem is the

860
00:35:13,430 --> 00:35:11,880
problem no matter what it is yeah

861
00:35:15,530 --> 00:35:13,440
yeah and you should want to exactly

862
00:35:17,750 --> 00:35:15,540
figure out uh what it is and and I do

863
00:35:18,890 --> 00:35:17,760

think that's the fortunate thing on this

864

00:35:20,150 --> 00:35:18,900

subject

865

00:35:21,770 --> 00:35:20,160

um is

866

00:35:24,829 --> 00:35:21,780

certainly what's driving members of

867

00:35:25,849 --> 00:35:24,839

Congress uh to a degree

868

00:35:28,010 --> 00:35:25,859

um you know there are other degrees

869

00:35:29,510 --> 00:35:28,020

which are driving them you know on the

870

00:35:31,130 --> 00:35:29,520

the more extraordinary stuff but they

871

00:35:33,770 --> 00:35:31,140

want to know you know what is this

872

00:35:35,630 --> 00:35:33,780

that's going on uh and I think you know

873

00:35:37,490 --> 00:35:35,640

at least a significant number of people

874

00:35:39,230 --> 00:35:37,500

in the military you know law enforcement

875

00:35:42,050 --> 00:35:39,240

intelligence Community want to know as

876

00:35:44,270 --> 00:35:42,060

well what you know what is the nature of

877

00:35:47,569 --> 00:35:44,280

these intrusions what prospective threat

878

00:35:50,270 --> 00:35:47,579

does it pose yeah what is your general

879

00:35:53,450 --> 00:35:50,280

feeling from you know any any sources

880

00:35:55,849 --> 00:35:53,460

you may have as far as is this more of a

881

00:35:57,950 --> 00:35:55,859

drone issue or is this a UAP issue and

882

00:36:00,470 --> 00:35:57,960

what I mean by that is

883

00:36:02,810 --> 00:36:00,480

um it doesn't seem to be just a drone

884

00:36:06,349 --> 00:36:02,820

issue or they would be for threat with

885

00:36:08,210 --> 00:36:06,359

the language you know yeah for ndaa and

886

00:36:09,290 --> 00:36:08,220

everything but what's your take what you

887

00:36:10,130 --> 00:36:09,300

know what are you feeling what are you

888

00:36:13,510 --> 00:36:10,140

hearing

889

00:36:15,890 --> 00:36:13,520

well I mean I I think you know there are

890

00:36:17,390 --> 00:36:15,900

both is happening

891

00:36:19,730 --> 00:36:17,400

um I think it's certainly some of the

892

00:36:20,870 --> 00:36:19,740

military cases there is a

893

00:36:22,370 --> 00:36:20,880

um you know there is a foreign

894

00:36:25,810 --> 00:36:22,380

adversarial element with the Chinese

895

00:36:29,450 --> 00:36:25,820

using civilian platforms to mask pla

896

00:36:32,450 --> 00:36:29,460

military operations but there's also uh

897

00:36:35,390 --> 00:36:32,460

I'm extremely confident uh you know a

898

00:36:38,569 --> 00:36:35,400

non drone or a really unconventional UAP

899

00:36:40,910 --> 00:36:38,579

style activity that's that's bearing

900

00:36:43,970 --> 00:36:40,920

um into those you know the carrier

901
00:36:46,790 --> 00:36:43,980
strike groups some of those operations

902
00:36:49,310 --> 00:36:46,800
um sensitive military test flights the

903
00:36:50,990 --> 00:36:49,320
space domain underwater because the

904
00:36:53,990 --> 00:36:51,000
performance characteristics that the

905
00:36:56,510 --> 00:36:54,000
sensors and in you know cases that you

906
00:36:58,370 --> 00:36:56,520
know Pilots also seeing things they do

907
00:37:01,069 --> 00:36:58,380
not conform to any known you know

908
00:37:03,589 --> 00:37:01,079
vehicles or the intelligence communities

909
00:37:05,630 --> 00:37:03,599
understanding of of what foreign

910
00:37:07,730 --> 00:37:05,640
adversarial uh you know again China

911
00:37:11,030 --> 00:37:07,740
Russia for example having development

912
00:37:13,069 --> 00:37:11,040
right that they they are so far beyond

913
00:37:15,470 --> 00:37:13,079

um and

914

00:37:17,870 --> 00:37:15,480

um it's also you know I I think a point

915

00:37:19,670 --> 00:37:17,880

of note that that you know

916

00:37:22,310 --> 00:37:19,680

if you have

917

00:37:24,470 --> 00:37:22,320

um Russian and Chinese air Crews

918

00:37:26,390 --> 00:37:24,480

military air Crews talking about seeing

919

00:37:29,990 --> 00:37:26,400

things that they don't understand

920

00:37:31,910 --> 00:37:30,000

and you know if we know that you know if

921

00:37:34,730 --> 00:37:31,920

we've detected them talking about those

922

00:37:39,230 --> 00:37:34,740

things then you know there's a pretty

923

00:37:41,390 --> 00:37:39,240

good Baseline to think okay well it's

924

00:37:43,430 --> 00:37:41,400

it's some of this is is you know it's a

925

00:37:45,650 --> 00:37:43,440

it's a global issue and it's not just

926
00:37:47,210 --> 00:37:45,660
them doing it right um you know you do

927
00:37:48,710 --> 00:37:47,220
have red teaming right where you test

928
00:37:50,750 --> 00:37:48,720
your own technology against your own

929
00:37:52,490 --> 00:37:50,760
people but certainly in the case of the

930
00:37:55,490 --> 00:37:52,500
US there are very strict protocols to be

931
00:37:58,970 --> 00:37:55,500
doing that for reasons of flight safety

932
00:38:01,130 --> 00:37:58,980
um and it's interesting and they're off

933
00:38:04,390 --> 00:38:01,140
like safety concerns that that bear down

934
00:38:07,430 --> 00:38:04,400
heavily on this and I think you know

935
00:38:08,870 --> 00:38:07,440
the best way to kill off a career you

936
00:38:11,270 --> 00:38:08,880
know you might think is to talk about

937
00:38:13,490 --> 00:38:11,280
the issue because of the stigma but the

938
00:38:15,530 --> 00:38:13,500

very best way to kill off a career is to

939

00:38:17,569 --> 00:38:15,540

push it aside and then have an impact at

940

00:38:19,430 --> 00:38:17,579

some point where an air crew die and you

941

00:38:21,290 --> 00:38:19,440

know subjects to one person and two

942

00:38:23,329 --> 00:38:21,300

person some of the intelligence

943

00:38:25,130 --> 00:38:23,339

platforms we fly you're getting over you

944

00:38:27,050 --> 00:38:25,140

know 10 people

945

00:38:28,849 --> 00:38:27,060

um so that's going to be you know

946

00:38:30,410 --> 00:38:28,859

submarine cruise for example if

947

00:38:32,089 --> 00:38:30,420

something is coming in very fast against

948

00:38:34,910 --> 00:38:32,099

the submarine instead of essentially

949

00:38:36,470 --> 00:38:34,920

waving and then bugging off what if it

950

00:38:38,450 --> 00:38:36,480

doesn't wave off

951

00:38:40,730 --> 00:38:38,460

um you know so so there's a safety

952

00:38:42,890 --> 00:38:40,740

element that drives the the

953

00:38:45,109 --> 00:38:42,900

extraordinary element here which to me

954

00:38:47,510 --> 00:38:45,119

and also that Congress has its teeth in

955

00:38:49,670 --> 00:38:47,520

it it's not going away now

956

00:38:52,550 --> 00:38:49,680

um even if there is you know an active

957

00:38:55,430 --> 00:38:52,560

effort to try and slow roll

958

00:38:57,770 --> 00:38:55,440

um and you know defray everything as you

959

00:39:00,950 --> 00:38:57,780

know conventional in explanation or

960

00:39:03,710 --> 00:39:00,960

sensor anomaly or Pilot you know took

961

00:39:04,690 --> 00:39:03,720

too many you know stay awake drugs

962

00:39:06,950 --> 00:39:04,700

um

963

00:39:08,930 --> 00:39:06,960

yeah the sensor anomaly thing is

964

00:39:10,370 --> 00:39:08,940

incredible to me considering how they've

965

00:39:12,829 --> 00:39:10,380

blamed sightings on anomalous

966

00:39:14,630 --> 00:39:12,839

propagation since the late 40s you know

967

00:39:17,210 --> 00:39:14,640

it's like well at this point you think

968

00:39:19,250 --> 00:39:17,220

you would have that worked out yeah and

969

00:39:21,050 --> 00:39:19,260

but but look look let's be clear I mean

970

00:39:22,550 --> 00:39:21,060

sensor anomalies do happen you know if

971

00:39:24,230 --> 00:39:22,560

it's configured for something in a

972

00:39:26,810 --> 00:39:24,240

certain way uh you know some of this

973

00:39:29,510 --> 00:39:26,820

will be sensor anomalies but not all of

974

00:39:31,849 --> 00:39:29,520

it is and to say I I mean that's where I

975

00:39:33,950 --> 00:39:31,859

think you're right is just to blur it

976

00:39:36,530 --> 00:39:33,960

off is everything is a weather balloon

977

00:39:38,270 --> 00:39:36,540

um it's just

978

00:39:40,790 --> 00:39:38,280

what we need you know we have a big

979

00:39:43,130 --> 00:39:40,800

problem then with sensors and secondly

980

00:39:45,170 --> 00:39:43,140

and training of our Pilots exactly

981

00:39:47,870 --> 00:39:45,180

exactly we have a big problem with with

982

00:39:50,690 --> 00:39:47,880

uh you know pilots and their eyeballs uh

983

00:39:52,670 --> 00:39:50,700

and sonar operators and space uh

984

00:39:55,670 --> 00:39:52,680

apparatus controllers so you know it's

985

00:39:58,250 --> 00:39:55,680

it's pretty that's to me is why I think

986

00:40:00,530 --> 00:39:58,260

you know it's it's I I get frustrated

987

00:40:02,030 --> 00:40:00,540

sometimes when you know because if you

988

00:40:03,710 --> 00:40:02,040

talk to the people who are doing this

989

00:40:05,710 --> 00:40:03,720

stuff in the conventional space right

990

00:40:08,210 --> 00:40:05,720

what they're trained to do you know

991

00:40:09,950 --> 00:40:08,220

incredibly highly trained to intercept

992

00:40:12,349 --> 00:40:09,960

with you know

993

00:40:15,530 --> 00:40:12,359

intelligently controlled Chinese or

994

00:40:17,329 --> 00:40:15,540

Russian Pilots or submarines as the

995

00:40:19,670 --> 00:40:17,339

level of professionalism and training

996

00:40:21,530 --> 00:40:19,680

and you know submariners for example to

997

00:40:23,390 --> 00:40:21,540

get their Dolphins the amount of effort

998

00:40:24,890 --> 00:40:23,400

you know years of training for Pilots to

999

00:40:26,770 --> 00:40:24,900

you know studying every waking hour

1000

00:40:29,569 --> 00:40:26,780

essentially when they're not on on Watch

1001

00:40:32,690 --> 00:40:29,579

and you know these aren't idiots or

1002

00:40:34,609 --> 00:40:32,700

people who just decided you know oh in

1003

00:40:35,930 --> 00:40:34,619

six months I'm you know it's not like

1004

00:40:37,250 --> 00:40:35,940

they've just gone through basic training

1005

00:40:40,370 --> 00:40:37,260

right these are people who are

1006

00:40:43,370 --> 00:40:40,380

incredibly technically skilled

1007

00:40:47,150 --> 00:40:43,380

um you know at their jobs yeah

1008

00:40:48,650 --> 00:40:47,160

now yeah and along along these lines in

1009

00:40:50,750 --> 00:40:48,660

terms of what you're saying in terms of

1010

00:40:54,109 --> 00:40:50,760

Congress sinking their teeth into it and

1011

00:40:56,930 --> 00:40:54,119

everything else what in looking at the

1012

00:41:01,190 --> 00:40:56,940

NDA legislation that was recently passed

1013

00:41:04,970 --> 00:41:01,200

and and the the quite large section on

1014

00:41:05,569 --> 00:41:04,980

UAP issues that is in there

1015

00:41:08,630 --> 00:41:05,579

um

1016

00:41:10,670 --> 00:41:08,640

what did you find that is the most

1017

00:41:12,650 --> 00:41:10,680

exciting to you or you think has the

1018

00:41:15,650 --> 00:41:12,660

most potential within that NDA

1019

00:41:18,410 --> 00:41:15,660

legislation and is there anything about

1020

00:41:20,390 --> 00:41:18,420

that NDA legislation that gives you

1021

00:41:23,150 --> 00:41:20,400

pause or makes you think that something

1022

00:41:24,589 --> 00:41:23,160

might be kept from the public that

1023

00:41:27,410 --> 00:41:24,599

really should come out

1024

00:41:29,510 --> 00:41:27,420

well one of the things that is very

1025

00:41:31,490 --> 00:41:29,520

frustrating and I think

1026

00:41:33,589 --> 00:41:31,500

uh quite frankly patently absurd in

1027

00:41:34,910 --> 00:41:33,599

terms of the over classification and

1028

00:41:36,410 --> 00:41:34,920

there's a you know there is an agreement

1029

00:41:38,210 --> 00:41:36,420

I think with a lot of people like

1030

00:41:41,450 --> 00:41:38,220

Director of National Intelligence Harold

1031

00:41:43,130 --> 00:41:41,460

Haynes is you know I know is a very

1032

00:41:45,710 --> 00:41:43,140

um Keen that this is the

1033

00:41:49,069 --> 00:41:45,720

overclassification issue is a problem

1034

00:41:51,050 --> 00:41:49,079

um it slows down uh action it can annoy

1035

00:41:53,150 --> 00:41:51,060

allies sometimes and a lot of it is

1036

00:41:55,430 --> 00:41:53,160

unnecessary

1037

00:41:57,770 --> 00:41:55,440

um some of it is extremely necessary but

1038

00:42:00,109 --> 00:41:57,780

but the overclassification in terms of

1039

00:42:01,910 --> 00:42:00,119

uh let's talk about if we talk about UAP

1040

00:42:04,130 --> 00:42:01,920

imagery

1041

00:42:07,190 --> 00:42:04,140

um that is still classified that has

1042

00:42:09,170 --> 00:42:07,200

been moved to a more restrictive

1043

00:42:11,990 --> 00:42:09,180

um access points right where you know

1044

00:42:14,210 --> 00:42:12,000

again I know for a fact a few years ago

1045

00:42:15,950 --> 00:42:14,220

you you could essentially access that

1046

00:42:17,569 --> 00:42:15,960

with a relatively low it wasn't

1047

00:42:19,550 --> 00:42:17,579

compartmented it wasn't in its own

1048

00:42:20,870 --> 00:42:19,560

keyboard and people would go and look at

1049

00:42:22,790 --> 00:42:20,880

it because it was they thought it was

1050

00:42:24,290 --> 00:42:22,800

cool and weird right you know if you had

1051

00:42:26,690 --> 00:42:24,300

the intelligence clearance this is hey

1052

00:42:28,730 --> 00:42:26,700

look what the hell is this thing

1053

00:42:31,490 --> 00:42:28,740

um now that that has been moved to

1054

00:42:34,250 --> 00:42:31,500

restricted portfolio it's been kept away

1055

00:42:36,849 --> 00:42:34,260

because they don't want it to leak and

1056

00:42:39,349 --> 00:42:36,859

there aren't ways to to

1057

00:42:41,990 --> 00:42:39,359

provide imagery

1058

00:42:43,849 --> 00:42:42,000

um that can you know

1059

00:42:46,370 --> 00:42:43,859

protect National Security right that you

1060

00:42:48,410 --> 00:42:46,380

can redact uh either the data points

1061

00:42:50,210 --> 00:42:48,420

that they're shown there

1062

00:42:51,829 --> 00:42:50,220

um you know foreign you know the

1063

00:42:54,230 --> 00:42:51,839

trainings because of their own

1064

00:42:56,450 --> 00:42:54,240

capabilities are going to assume that we

1065

00:42:58,550 --> 00:42:56,460

have high definition cameras which we do

1066

00:43:00,109 --> 00:42:58,560

you know you what where you don't want

1067

00:43:01,309 --> 00:43:00,119

to release stuff right is is sensor

1068

00:43:04,910 --> 00:43:01,319

imagery

1069

00:43:06,530 --> 00:43:04,920

um but if you can release you know some

1070

00:43:08,390 --> 00:43:06,540

of the test imagery that we've released

1071

00:43:11,089 --> 00:43:08,400

I mean they showed off the new B21

1072

00:43:13,490 --> 00:43:11,099

Raider they do a lot of stuff A lot of

1073

00:43:15,710 --> 00:43:13,500

times whereas a choice has been made

1074

00:43:18,589 --> 00:43:15,720

that the benefits accrued of releasing

1075

00:43:20,750 --> 00:43:18,599

something outweigh the costs in terms of

1076

00:43:22,250 --> 00:43:20,760

the classification impulse and I'm sorry

1077

00:43:24,950 --> 00:43:22,260

if they're releasing that stuff they can

1078

00:43:26,150 --> 00:43:24,960

release you know more imagery that sell

1079

00:43:27,950 --> 00:43:26,160

but they don't want to because they

1080

00:43:31,069 --> 00:43:27,960

don't know how to explain it and it

1081

00:43:32,270 --> 00:43:31,079

opens it kind of works yeah that's what

1082

00:43:34,010 --> 00:43:32,280

I was kind of thinking I was going to

1083

00:43:36,170 --> 00:43:34,020

ask you well I don't why don't they

1084

00:43:37,730 --> 00:43:36,180

release it and it's pretty much what

1085

00:43:40,069 --> 00:43:37,740

you're saying is because they don't know

1086

00:43:41,569 --> 00:43:40,079

what it is yeah and their best excuse

1087

00:43:42,890 --> 00:43:41,579

for you know not wanting to talk about

1088

00:43:44,450 --> 00:43:42,900

this is that that they have other

1089

00:43:46,250 --> 00:43:44,460

Mission requirements right Office of

1090

00:43:47,809 --> 00:43:46,260

Naval intelligence for example which of

1091

00:43:49,730 --> 00:43:47,819

course is a key driver on this wants to

1092

00:43:51,829 --> 00:43:49,740

be focused on

1093

00:43:53,150 --> 00:43:51,839

um you know the Chinese because we're

1094

00:43:55,010 --> 00:43:53,160

probably going to go to war with China

1095

00:43:55,910 --> 00:43:55,020

in the next few years or at least Taiwan

1096

00:43:57,349 --> 00:43:55,920

will

1097

00:43:59,030 --> 00:43:57,359

um and that you know I get that right

1098

00:44:01,130 --> 00:43:59,040

analysts want to focus on that they

1099

00:44:03,109 --> 00:44:01,140

don't want to do this because

1100

00:44:04,790 --> 00:44:03,119

what can they get out of it in terms of

1101
00:44:08,210 --> 00:44:04,800
the immediate National Security value

1102
00:44:10,550 --> 00:44:08,220
versus studying Chinese capabilities but

1103
00:44:11,990 --> 00:44:10,560
the problem becomes

1104
00:44:13,309 --> 00:44:12,000
um I think for them and this is the

1105
00:44:17,150 --> 00:44:13,319
benefit to your question in terms of

1106
00:44:18,470 --> 00:44:17,160
Congress that that there are uh you know

1107
00:44:20,450 --> 00:44:18,480
I would say at a scientific and

1108
00:44:24,290 --> 00:44:20,460
philosophical level deep questions that

1109
00:44:26,089 --> 00:44:24,300
you know Congress once you know to push

1110
00:44:27,530 --> 00:44:26,099
um the government on

1111
00:44:30,470 --> 00:44:27,540
um but they're also profound obviously

1112
00:44:33,109 --> 00:44:30,480
national security questions and and

1113
00:44:35,329 --> 00:44:33,119

you know I think the some of the things

1114

00:44:37,790 --> 00:44:35,339

that really are a particular value there

1115

00:44:40,190 --> 00:44:37,800

you know breaching the kind of

1116

00:44:41,990 --> 00:44:40,200

um third rail as it were of uh the

1117

00:44:43,910 --> 00:44:42,000

undersea domain getting into that

1118

00:44:45,890 --> 00:44:43,920

because a lot of that is

1119

00:44:47,390 --> 00:44:45,900

in some areas very legitimately

1120

00:44:48,589 --> 00:44:47,400

classified

1121

00:44:51,109 --> 00:44:48,599

um space

1122

00:44:54,530 --> 00:44:51,119

um the contract inside that have things

1123

00:44:57,290 --> 00:44:54,540

been pushed to contractors to evade

1124

00:44:59,569 --> 00:44:57,300

um reporting requirements you know at a

1125

00:45:01,550 --> 00:44:59,579

minimum that's that is not con I think

1126
00:45:04,069 --> 00:45:01,560
compatible with American the American

1127
00:45:05,329 --> 00:45:04,079
tradition of governance uh that that you

1128
00:45:07,130 --> 00:45:05,339
could hide things and I think things

1129
00:45:09,710 --> 00:45:07,140
have been hidden

1130
00:45:13,010 --> 00:45:09,720
um and I also think that

1131
00:45:14,630 --> 00:45:13,020
um you know again just the broad uh

1132
00:45:16,250 --> 00:45:14,640
desire of

1133
00:45:17,990 --> 00:45:16,260
um Congress to to you know again

1134
00:45:20,809 --> 00:45:18,000
Congress has its teeth in it we are a

1135
00:45:23,270 --> 00:45:20,819
democracy that that's that's it's not

1136
00:45:25,550 --> 00:45:23,280
going away now even if people might want

1137
00:45:26,930 --> 00:45:25,560
it to for various reasons and you know

1138
00:45:29,150 --> 00:45:26,940

it's just one example Mike Gallagher

1139

00:45:30,829 --> 00:45:29,160

right who's the you know head up

1140

00:45:32,990 --> 00:45:30,839

um the China Select Committee in the new

1141

00:45:35,390 --> 00:45:33,000

House of Representatives you know is big

1142

00:45:37,130 --> 00:45:35,400

on this issue is is you know

1143

00:45:39,170 --> 00:45:37,140

well you know he's going to have the

1144

00:45:40,730 --> 00:45:39,180

opportunity to ask

1145

00:45:43,910 --> 00:45:40,740

um okay what are the Chinese working on

1146

00:45:45,470 --> 00:45:43,920

and certainly even if you the the most

1147

00:45:47,270 --> 00:45:45,480

stupid argument I think for trying to

1148

00:45:49,490 --> 00:45:47,280

put this back in a box and say it's all

1149

00:45:52,670 --> 00:45:49,500

you know silly people and confusion is

1150

00:45:55,069 --> 00:45:52,680

well if something is going on here uh

1151

00:45:57,170 --> 00:45:55,079

and the Chinese are working very hard to

1152

00:45:59,630 --> 00:45:57,180

understand it which South China Morning

1153

00:46:02,089 --> 00:45:59,640

Post is which has very good links to the

1154

00:46:04,490 --> 00:46:02,099

Chinese military is reported on uh the

1155

00:46:06,589 --> 00:46:04,500

PLA and AI trying to understand this if

1156

00:46:09,770 --> 00:46:06,599

they figure it out before we do right we

1157

00:46:11,230 --> 00:46:09,780

have a big you know enter expletive of

1158

00:46:14,450 --> 00:46:11,240

choice problem

1159

00:46:15,890 --> 00:46:14,460

and so and so you know enough people in

1160

00:46:17,690 --> 00:46:15,900

the National Security apparatus and

1161

00:46:18,550 --> 00:46:17,700

Congress understand that

1162

00:46:21,950 --> 00:46:18,560

um

1163

00:46:23,870 --> 00:46:21,960

you know so that you know I just I think

1164

00:46:26,569 --> 00:46:23,880

it's it's a very it's a revolutionary

1165

00:46:28,910 --> 00:46:26,579

time in the in in the subject area even

1166

00:46:31,250 --> 00:46:28,920

if a lot of it is behind the scenes and

1167

00:46:32,630 --> 00:46:31,260

you know but in Washington it frequently

1168

00:46:35,390 --> 00:46:32,640

comes up it's just one of those things

1169

00:46:37,130 --> 00:46:35,400

that it's you know don't talk about this

1170

00:46:39,589 --> 00:46:37,140

is the kind of watchword of the day in

1171

00:46:41,030 --> 00:46:39,599

the government because I guess you know

1172

00:46:42,230 --> 00:46:41,040

ultimately the bureaucracy doesn't know

1173

00:46:43,190 --> 00:46:42,240

how to deal with them bureaucracies

1174

00:46:45,650 --> 00:46:43,200

exist

1175

00:46:47,630 --> 00:46:45,660

yeah make things simple for themselves

1176

00:46:50,329 --> 00:46:47,640

yeah a couple things I thought of there

1177

00:46:53,329 --> 00:46:50,339

the first the first of which is if um

1178

00:46:55,010 --> 00:46:53,339

you know the UAP issue kind of gets the

1179

00:46:58,010 --> 00:46:55,020

push to the side a little bit for more

1180

00:46:59,930 --> 00:46:58,020

pressing issues like uh China or Russia

1181

00:47:03,950 --> 00:46:59,940

and and what they're up to well it kind

1182

00:47:06,050 --> 00:47:03,960

of you know then says that well UAP you

1183

00:47:07,910 --> 00:47:06,060

know they're not theirs

1184

00:47:10,069 --> 00:47:07,920

or that would be a part of that equation

1185

00:47:13,730 --> 00:47:10,079

right oh absolutely no I think I think

1186

00:47:15,770 --> 00:47:13,740

that's you know it's it's it's exactly

1187

00:47:19,069 --> 00:47:15,780

um and the other one is rather than a

1188

00:47:21,170 --> 00:47:19,079

space race maybe we're in a UAP race

1189

00:47:22,730 --> 00:47:21,180

right no I think it's cool I mean we are

1190

00:47:24,650 --> 00:47:22,740

obviously I mean the Russians have

1191

00:47:27,530 --> 00:47:24,660

always been doing this it's part and

1192

00:47:29,510 --> 00:47:27,540

parcel with how they that the Russian

1193

00:47:30,890 --> 00:47:29,520

intelligence modus operandi operates

1194

00:47:31,430 --> 00:47:30,900

that they love

1195

00:47:32,770 --> 00:47:31,440

um

1196

00:47:36,170 --> 00:47:32,780

you know

1197

00:47:38,329 --> 00:47:36,180

unconventional uh means of action and

1198

00:47:40,130 --> 00:47:38,339

and you know pushing the boat because

1199

00:47:42,349 --> 00:47:40,140

you know something like this if you can

1200

00:47:44,870 --> 00:47:42,359

figure it out would allow you

1201

00:47:47,510 --> 00:47:44,880

frankly with relatively little bang for

1202

00:47:48,710 --> 00:47:47,520

the buck massive strategic over match in

1203

00:47:52,010 --> 00:47:48,720

a short window if you could really

1204

00:47:54,410 --> 00:47:52,020

understand the underlying uh physics

1205

00:47:55,910 --> 00:47:54,420

that you know I would say that that you

1206

00:47:57,470 --> 00:47:55,920

know certainly Congress I mean the

1207

00:47:59,569 --> 00:47:57,480

reporting now as well that you know

1208

00:48:00,950 --> 00:47:59,579

breakthrough technology is being talked

1209

00:48:04,370 --> 00:48:00,960

about an official government you know

1210

00:48:06,710 --> 00:48:04,380

that this is the the they know

1211

00:48:08,990 --> 00:48:06,720

and also if this is the Chinese and

1212

00:48:10,430 --> 00:48:09,000

Russians what the hell are they doing I

1213

00:48:12,470 --> 00:48:10,440

mean Vladimir Putin's government

1214

00:48:15,309 --> 00:48:12,480

Vladimir Putin's government is

1215

00:48:17,569 --> 00:48:15,319

fundamentally I would say you know

1216

00:48:19,130 --> 00:48:17,579

threatened in terms of his Prestige

1217

00:48:20,630 --> 00:48:19,140

potentially if the ukrainians when they

1218

00:48:22,790 --> 00:48:20,640

make their push to Crimea his very

1219

00:48:25,010 --> 00:48:22,800

position in power or why isn't he

1220

00:48:26,930 --> 00:48:25,020

deploying these capabilities the same

1221

00:48:29,390 --> 00:48:26,940

point of the Chinese facing a

1222

00:48:32,270 --> 00:48:29,400

fundamental Xi Jinping it's a matter of

1223

00:48:34,430 --> 00:48:32,280

Destiny and political identity that he's

1224

00:48:35,990 --> 00:48:34,440

able to take Taiwan why isn't he

1225

00:48:38,510 --> 00:48:36,000

deploying these to sort of say to the

1226

00:48:40,490 --> 00:48:38,520

U.S you tell the Taiwanese to back down

1227

00:48:43,010 --> 00:48:40,500

otherwise we're you know we're just

1228

00:48:44,030 --> 00:48:43,020

gonna annihilate your entire Battle

1229

00:48:46,069 --> 00:48:44,040

Force

1230

00:48:47,470 --> 00:48:46,079

um I mean I guess some of the UAP thing

1231

00:48:50,450 --> 00:48:47,480

on the right there is less of a

1232

00:48:52,790 --> 00:48:50,460

manifested military Dimension to it sure

1233

00:48:55,309 --> 00:48:52,800

but the broad parameters of the physics

1234

00:48:57,230 --> 00:48:55,319

would suggest you know a capability to

1235

00:48:59,630 --> 00:48:57,240

deliver threat yeah so if something's

1236

00:49:01,609 --> 00:48:59,640

going faster than the speed of uh light

1237

00:49:04,849 --> 00:49:01,619

can you really put a machine gun on it I

1238

00:49:07,670 --> 00:49:04,859

don't know right so

1239

00:49:11,030 --> 00:49:07,680

yeah and along those lines you've been

1240

00:49:12,890 --> 00:49:11,040

covering uh the war in Ukraine since it

1241

00:49:15,770 --> 00:49:12,900

began and

1242

00:49:17,510 --> 00:49:15,780

um you know here we are arguably over a

1243

00:49:19,069 --> 00:49:17,520

year into that conflict depending on

1244

00:49:20,569 --> 00:49:19,079

whether you're talking about when they

1245

00:49:22,609 --> 00:49:20,579

actually invaded or when they started

1246

00:49:23,690 --> 00:49:22,619

lining up and the preparation and all

1247

00:49:25,910 --> 00:49:23,700

that

1248

00:49:27,770 --> 00:49:25,920

um you have a strong background in

1249

00:49:29,089 --> 00:49:27,780

looking at the military capabilities of

1250

00:49:31,550 --> 00:49:29,099

Russia and China

1251
00:49:34,430 --> 00:49:31,560
now along with what you're saying there

1252
00:49:36,349 --> 00:49:34,440
is there anything that you've seen in

1253
00:49:38,569 --> 00:49:36,359
that conflict that that directly

1254
00:49:40,130 --> 00:49:38,579
reflects directly or indirectly other

1255
00:49:43,130 --> 00:49:40,140
than what you just mentioned that really

1256
00:49:46,190 --> 00:49:43,140
reflects back onto the UAP issue and

1257
00:49:48,770 --> 00:49:46,200
really tracing the source or or anything

1258
00:49:50,990 --> 00:49:48,780
else in in relation to kind of like the

1259
00:49:52,730 --> 00:49:51,000
war in Ukraine and and what can be

1260
00:49:53,750 --> 00:49:52,740
derived from that in terms of the UAP

1261
00:49:56,210 --> 00:49:53,760
issue

1262
00:49:58,910 --> 00:49:56,220
I mean if anything it's the the the

1263
00:50:00,530 --> 00:49:58,920

inverse right that you know the Russians

1264

00:50:05,030 --> 00:50:00,540

have shown themselves

1265

00:50:09,050 --> 00:50:05,040

command and control Logistics air power

1266

00:50:11,210 --> 00:50:09,060

um far weaker uh census operational

1267

00:50:14,210 --> 00:50:11,220

security far weaker than

1268

00:50:16,430 --> 00:50:14,220

I and most I think people looking at

1269

00:50:18,710 --> 00:50:16,440

them in before certainly the US military

1270

00:50:20,569 --> 00:50:18,720

had assessed them to be at I mean they

1271

00:50:22,370 --> 00:50:20,579

so the idea that they have these

1272

00:50:26,089 --> 00:50:22,380

breakthrough Technologies in terms of

1273

00:50:28,490 --> 00:50:26,099

you know Battlefield capabilities it's

1274

00:50:31,550 --> 00:50:28,500

really you know limited to a

1275

00:50:34,370 --> 00:50:31,560

small number of their best missile

1276

00:50:37,730 --> 00:50:34,380

platforms where the Russians do have

1277

00:50:40,670 --> 00:50:37,740

breakthrough success you know and which

1278

00:50:44,470 --> 00:50:40,680

also attenuates to their desire to kind

1279

00:50:47,809 --> 00:50:44,480

of be perpetually interested in you know

1280

00:50:49,910 --> 00:50:47,819

UAP related issues is

1281

00:50:51,770 --> 00:50:49,920

um more on the kind of Boutique

1282

00:50:53,569 --> 00:50:51,780

intelligence world so I would say

1283

00:50:55,849 --> 00:50:53,579

directed energy weapons which I think is

1284

00:50:58,130 --> 00:50:55,859

a responsible the Russians for a lot of

1285

00:50:59,809 --> 00:50:58,140

the Havana syndrome stuff

1286

00:51:01,430 --> 00:50:59,819

um but it's I mean it's a perfect

1287

00:51:03,230 --> 00:51:01,440

Russian game for them there because

1288

00:51:05,450 --> 00:51:03,240

there is a paranoia element that is

1289

00:51:08,630 --> 00:51:05,460

driving that but there's also a I would

1290

00:51:11,089 --> 00:51:08,640

say the evidence suggests a physical

1291

00:51:14,390 --> 00:51:11,099

um you know capability driving it that

1292

00:51:16,430 --> 00:51:14,400

they were more advanced than we are

1293

00:51:18,530 --> 00:51:16,440

um and

1294

00:51:19,910 --> 00:51:18,540

um but in much of the same way as the

1295

00:51:21,049 --> 00:51:19,920

UAP issue the US government doesn't

1296

00:51:22,970 --> 00:51:21,059

really quite know how to deal with that

1297

00:51:24,589 --> 00:51:22,980

because they don't want to I would say

1298

00:51:28,490 --> 00:51:24,599

admit that the Russians have been doing

1299

00:51:31,549 --> 00:51:28,500

very aggressive yeah I mean

1300

00:51:34,250 --> 00:51:31,559

yeah right yeah how do you address that

1301
00:51:37,250 --> 00:51:34,260
and admit it and and reveal that without

1302
00:51:39,829 --> 00:51:37,260
you know taking a more like step next

1303
00:51:41,329 --> 00:51:39,839
but for hurting all these people but but

1304
00:51:42,890 --> 00:51:41,339
the government still says well we don't

1305
00:51:44,990 --> 00:51:42,900
know anything there and we're looking at

1306
00:51:46,609 --> 00:51:45,000
it and we can't find anything well you

1307
00:51:49,309 --> 00:51:46,619
know I know for a fact that is not the

1308
00:51:51,230 --> 00:51:49,319
consensus Viewpoint of you know some

1309
00:51:53,030 --> 00:51:51,240
close U.S allies can't understand why

1310
00:51:55,250 --> 00:51:53,040
the US has been so reticent to address

1311
00:51:56,750 --> 00:51:55,260
something going on and I also know that

1312
00:51:59,270 --> 00:51:56,760
there's some very sensitive intelligence

1313
00:52:01,250 --> 00:51:59,280

that would give a very confident idea

1314

00:52:03,049 --> 00:52:01,260

that the Russians have had a role in at

1315

00:52:06,109 --> 00:52:03,059

least some of those incidents

1316

00:52:08,569 --> 00:52:06,119

um and so to me you know this is the the

1317

00:52:09,950 --> 00:52:08,579

thing you learn in Washington is not

1318

00:52:11,569 --> 00:52:09,960

because people are bad not because

1319

00:52:12,829 --> 00:52:11,579

they're traitors not because they want

1320

00:52:16,010 --> 00:52:12,839

to lie to the American people but

1321

00:52:17,510 --> 00:52:16,020

bureaucracies want the easiest path

1322

00:52:19,069 --> 00:52:17,520

through ultimately they don't want to

1323

00:52:20,510 --> 00:52:19,079

rock the boat

1324

00:52:22,309 --> 00:52:20,520

um both because they have things they

1325

00:52:23,990 --> 00:52:22,319

need to do again you know dealing with

1326

00:52:26,930 --> 00:52:24,000

China and Russia and that military

1327

00:52:29,450 --> 00:52:26,940

Battlefield thing but also because you

1328

00:52:31,430 --> 00:52:29,460

know political Masters would prefer you

1329

00:52:33,230 --> 00:52:31,440

know you know the president no president

1330

00:52:34,970 --> 00:52:33,240

particularly wants to be told difficult

1331

00:52:37,970 --> 00:52:34,980

things you need to address this right

1332

00:52:40,490 --> 00:52:37,980

it's it's just you've got enough other

1333

00:52:42,109 --> 00:52:40,500

[h__h] going on that you you know want to

1334

00:52:43,990 --> 00:52:42,119

focus on that especially when you're 82

1335

00:52:47,569 --> 00:52:44,000

you just want to get through the term

1336

00:52:50,870 --> 00:52:47,579

I'm just kidding well no yeah I mean

1337

00:52:53,930 --> 00:52:50,880

it's a tough job I mean you know it's

1338

00:52:57,410 --> 00:52:53,940

it's 82 I got to deal with UAP and

1339

00:52:59,750 --> 00:52:57,420

Havana syndrome get me out of here yeah

1340

00:53:01,490 --> 00:52:59,760

um speaking of Russia though uh I I mean

1341

00:53:02,990 --> 00:53:01,500

I forget the source and I apologize

1342

00:53:06,109 --> 00:53:03,000

about this but there was something about

1343

00:53:08,390 --> 00:53:06,119

uh that some Russia general or something

1344

00:53:11,270 --> 00:53:08,400

said they figured out how to how to bait

1345

00:53:12,950 --> 00:53:11,280

or coax UAP my question for you is do

1346

00:53:16,970 --> 00:53:12,960

you know anything about America doing

1347

00:53:18,230 --> 00:53:16,980

that any successes or efforts yeah you

1348

00:53:20,390 --> 00:53:18,240

know I have to

1349

00:53:21,710 --> 00:53:20,400

um because I need to this Tim McMillan

1350

00:53:25,790 --> 00:53:21,720

um and I both

1351
00:53:27,470 --> 00:53:25,800
um so I would say uh you know yes but

1352
00:53:29,329 --> 00:53:27,480
it's still something I'm working on to

1353
00:53:30,650 --> 00:53:29,339
try and get to the point where it would

1354
00:53:33,290 --> 00:53:30,660
be

1355
00:53:36,589 --> 00:53:33,300
um you know reportable

1356
00:53:39,670 --> 00:53:36,599
um but I you know one of the things that

1357
00:53:43,849 --> 00:53:42,349
rightly I think you know sensitive in

1358
00:53:45,170 --> 00:53:43,859
terms of the sense of cyber we talked

1359
00:53:47,630 --> 00:53:45,180
about you know why can't we release more

1360
00:53:48,770 --> 00:53:47,640
imagery we should or the U.S government

1361
00:53:51,530 --> 00:53:48,780
should

1362
00:53:53,569 --> 00:53:51,540
um when you get into kind of Senses how

1363
00:53:55,370 --> 00:53:53,579

you configure them how you operate them

1364

00:53:56,870 --> 00:53:55,380

in any one moment you know the kind of

1365

00:53:58,190 --> 00:53:56,880

different power levels the platform you

1366

00:54:00,770 --> 00:53:58,200

know you think about the most basic

1367

00:54:02,390 --> 00:54:00,780

level active and passive sonar

1368

00:54:05,690 --> 00:54:02,400

um those things will have different

1369

00:54:08,329 --> 00:54:05,700

reactions in terms of you know if you're

1370

00:54:10,250 --> 00:54:08,339

pinged with active sonar you know

1371

00:54:12,230 --> 00:54:10,260

um you're going to know about it as a

1372

00:54:14,030 --> 00:54:12,240

you know you're a Submariner and you're

1373

00:54:15,890 --> 00:54:14,040

going to respond in a certain way so if

1374

00:54:19,309 --> 00:54:15,900

you start playing around with different

1375

00:54:21,349 --> 00:54:19,319

settings on very Advanced sensors you

1376
00:54:23,569 --> 00:54:21,359
know you might trigger a reaction and

1377
00:54:24,650 --> 00:54:23,579
certainly the Navy you know

1378
00:54:26,569 --> 00:54:24,660
um

1379
00:54:28,430 --> 00:54:26,579
is aware

1380
00:54:30,410 --> 00:54:28,440
um again I mean it is you know still

1381
00:54:31,910 --> 00:54:30,420
classified although I think it's pretty

1382
00:54:33,710 --> 00:54:31,920
basic

1383
00:54:35,329 --> 00:54:33,720
um that there is a connection point

1384
00:54:37,430 --> 00:54:35,339
between

1385
00:54:40,190 --> 00:54:37,440
um you know nuclear signatures and

1386
00:54:42,049 --> 00:54:40,200
intercepts by uaps

1387
00:54:43,609 --> 00:54:42,059
um and you know

1388
00:54:45,470 --> 00:54:43,619

part of the reason I think the

1389

00:54:47,510 --> 00:54:45,480

classification is that something can

1390

00:54:50,329 --> 00:54:47,520

detect nuclear forces at very long range

1391

00:54:52,549 --> 00:54:50,339

and do rapid intercept that's obviously

1392

00:54:54,170 --> 00:54:52,559

technological concern there that you

1393

00:54:56,510 --> 00:54:54,180

know your strategic nuclear forces are

1394

00:54:58,730 --> 00:54:56,520

vulnerable but you know

1395

00:55:00,049 --> 00:54:58,740

um how does that work and so one of the

1396

00:55:01,549 --> 00:55:00,059

you know things I've been trying to work

1397

00:55:03,170 --> 00:55:01,559

on is you know is there a lot the

1398

00:55:05,210 --> 00:55:03,180

extremely long-range anti-neutrino

1399

00:55:07,849 --> 00:55:05,220

detection that these things are using I

1400

00:55:09,290 --> 00:55:07,859

mean you get into physics and you know a

1401
00:55:10,370 --> 00:55:09,300
lot of professors sometimes thinking

1402
00:55:12,410 --> 00:55:10,380
what the hell are you talking about and

1403
00:55:13,790 --> 00:55:12,420
then you know but sometimes they're very

1404
00:55:16,609 --> 00:55:13,800
kind of helpful

1405
00:55:19,790 --> 00:55:16,619
um you know but but yes I mean I think

1406
00:55:22,250 --> 00:55:19,800
you know I I think the US has done that

1407
00:55:24,349 --> 00:55:22,260
I think you know I'm I'm confident about

1408
00:55:26,390 --> 00:55:24,359
that that the challenge is getting to a

1409
00:55:29,329 --> 00:55:26,400
point where

1410
00:55:31,069 --> 00:55:29,339
um you can put it into a you know

1411
00:55:33,829 --> 00:55:31,079
reported product

1412
00:55:35,270 --> 00:55:33,839
um because again it's you want to get

1413
00:55:36,650 --> 00:55:35,280

this subject right but I would say that

1414

00:55:37,670 --> 00:55:36,660

you know

1415

00:55:40,250 --> 00:55:37,680

um

1416

00:55:42,589 --> 00:55:40,260

it you know it would it would make sense

1417

00:55:44,870 --> 00:55:42,599

that you would want to

1418

00:55:45,589 --> 00:55:44,880

um you know figure out

1419

00:55:47,809 --> 00:55:45,599

um

1420

00:55:49,849 --> 00:55:47,819

how how things respond to certain things

1421

00:55:50,750 --> 00:55:49,859

yeah because then you can catch and I

1422

00:55:53,390 --> 00:55:50,760

don't want to be addressed for

1423

00:55:55,609 --> 00:55:53,400

engineering and I know with this subject

1424

00:55:56,870 --> 00:55:55,619

as well I don't want to be sometimes

1425

00:55:59,150 --> 00:55:56,880

there can be

1426

00:56:00,589 --> 00:55:59,160

temptation to kind of be all the

1427

00:56:02,390 --> 00:56:00,599

Mystique of the subject and I'm not

1428

00:56:04,609 --> 00:56:02,400

telling you what and and you know I

1429

00:56:06,589 --> 00:56:04,619

guess to a degree I'm doing that what I

1430

00:56:08,990 --> 00:56:06,599

would say is the things that I'm trying

1431

00:56:11,270 --> 00:56:09,000

to work on you need multiple sources on

1432

00:56:12,589 --> 00:56:11,280

this stuff because of how extraordinary

1433

00:56:14,569 --> 00:56:12,599

it is

1434

00:56:16,670 --> 00:56:14,579

um and I've spoken you know at various

1435

00:56:18,410 --> 00:56:16,680

levels of this you know I would say I

1436

00:56:20,510 --> 00:56:18,420

have at least one or two

1437

00:56:23,089 --> 00:56:20,520

extremely good sources you know

1438

00:56:24,890 --> 00:56:23,099

including most of the time people who no

1439

00:56:27,049 --> 00:56:24,900

one's heard about right you know because

1440

00:56:28,609 --> 00:56:27,059

they're just people doing something in a

1441

00:56:30,230 --> 00:56:28,619

in a specialized field in the government

1442

00:56:32,210 --> 00:56:30,240

or military

1443

00:56:34,490 --> 00:56:32,220

um but you need to nail it down because

1444

00:56:38,329 --> 00:56:34,500

the moment you know I think you get it

1445

00:56:40,370 --> 00:56:38,339

wrong uh you know you you you weaken the

1446

00:56:42,230 --> 00:56:40,380

subject matter significantly and you

1447

00:56:44,150 --> 00:56:42,240

allow it to be played off as a great

1448

00:56:46,549 --> 00:56:44,160

conspiracy and and I would say it's an

1449

00:56:49,250 --> 00:56:46,559

extension to that I I do

1450

00:56:51,829 --> 00:56:49,260

um although you know I I disagree with

1451

00:56:54,049 --> 00:56:51,839

his you know assessments and things

1452

00:56:55,130 --> 00:56:54,059

um you know there is a I think an

1453

00:56:59,450 --> 00:56:55,140

important role for people like Stephen

1454

00:57:02,270 --> 00:56:59,460

Green Street holding you know uh I mean

1455

00:57:04,309 --> 00:57:02,280

I think you know he he Revels in it but

1456

00:57:06,530 --> 00:57:04,319

you know you've we've got it those of us

1457

00:57:08,450 --> 00:57:06,540

who to who think something extraordinary

1458

00:57:10,609 --> 00:57:08,460

is going on as journalists you know need

1459

00:57:11,809 --> 00:57:10,619

to be able to

1460

00:57:14,089 --> 00:57:11,819

you know

1461

00:57:17,030 --> 00:57:14,099

um make sure make sure that we drop the

1462

00:57:18,890 --> 00:57:17,040

eyes and cross the t's when we do it and

1463

00:57:20,930 --> 00:57:18,900

um you know until now I've kind of been

1464

00:57:22,910 --> 00:57:20,940

you know helped I think a little bit in

1465

00:57:25,730 --> 00:57:22,920

terms of what I've written you know

1466

00:57:27,349 --> 00:57:25,740

which I stand by obviously but but

1467

00:57:28,730 --> 00:57:27,359

um by the fact that I'm kind of in you

1468

00:57:31,670 --> 00:57:28,740

know opinion jealous I can have people

1469

00:57:33,650 --> 00:57:31,680

on very deep background or or even off

1470

00:57:36,230 --> 00:57:33,660

the Record guiding me to to say things

1471

00:57:38,870 --> 00:57:36,240

but I think you know as we take the next

1472

00:57:40,730 --> 00:57:38,880

steps and whether that's you know

1473

00:57:41,690 --> 00:57:40,740

materials

1474

00:57:43,730 --> 00:57:41,700

um

1475

00:57:45,650 --> 00:57:43,740

know what's behind this

1476
00:57:46,970 --> 00:57:45,660
Etc you know you you've got to be able

1477
00:57:49,190 --> 00:57:46,980
to nail it down otherwise you're going

1478
00:57:52,069 --> 00:57:49,200
to have the kind of response you know

1479
00:57:54,410 --> 00:57:52,079
easily in in that you see from other

1480
00:57:56,569 --> 00:57:54,420
journalists who just say oh it's all you

1481
00:57:58,849 --> 00:57:56,579
know we can't find green men and make a

1482
00:58:01,130 --> 00:57:58,859
joke out of it yeah I mean the first

1483
00:58:03,049 --> 00:58:01,140
time you mentioned a UAP and it you know

1484
00:58:05,510 --> 00:58:03,059
a year goes by and it turns out to be a

1485
00:58:08,150 --> 00:58:05,520
drone you're screwed

1486
00:58:09,770 --> 00:58:08,160
you know yeah but but you know the

1487
00:58:10,910 --> 00:58:09,780
fortunate thing again which is why this

1488
00:58:12,470 --> 00:58:10,920

you know there is an extraordinary

1489

00:58:15,890 --> 00:58:12,480

element to this is

1490

00:58:18,890 --> 00:58:15,900

when you have people telling you you

1491

00:58:21,829 --> 00:58:18,900

know I have seen this oh yeah I saw that

1492

00:58:24,349 --> 00:58:21,839

as well on the imagery uh or if you have

1493

00:58:26,210 --> 00:58:24,359

you know a someone Manning a sensor

1494

00:58:28,849 --> 00:58:26,220

system you described it and said how

1495

00:58:30,890 --> 00:58:28,859

Exquisite the return the data return was

1496

00:58:32,870 --> 00:58:30,900

and and it matched all the things that

1497

00:58:34,910 --> 00:58:32,880

you would guide you know that would tell

1498

00:58:37,309 --> 00:58:34,920

you this is very unlikely to be

1499

00:58:39,890 --> 00:58:37,319

anomalous right if you have multiple

1500

00:58:41,870 --> 00:58:39,900

sense assistance in an individual you're

1501

00:58:43,910 --> 00:58:41,880

basically picking multiple things right

1502

00:58:45,890 --> 00:58:43,920

that are redundant you know and that

1503

00:58:48,650 --> 00:58:45,900

exists in a redundant fashion so that if

1504

00:58:50,450 --> 00:58:48,660

we go to war you know shooting down one

1505

00:58:52,849 --> 00:58:50,460

destroying a satellite doesn't

1506

00:58:54,770 --> 00:58:52,859

necessarily mean you're totally blinded

1507

00:58:56,510 --> 00:58:54,780

right you want multiple things picking

1508

00:58:58,730 --> 00:58:56,520

being able to track something if

1509

00:59:01,370 --> 00:58:58,740

multiple things are tracking something

1510

00:59:02,809 --> 00:59:01,380

and returning you know Exquisite returns

1511

00:59:04,490 --> 00:59:02,819

over a period

1512

00:59:05,990 --> 00:59:04,500

then something's probably going on there

1513

00:59:08,569 --> 00:59:06,000

that's not an anomalous return because

1514

00:59:11,569 --> 00:59:08,579

it's an or if it you know that those are

1515

00:59:15,650 --> 00:59:11,579

a lot of anomalies to be happening uh in

1516

00:59:18,650 --> 00:59:15,660

a probability sense and so you know yeah

1517

00:59:21,349 --> 00:59:18,660

absolutely and along those lines I

1518

00:59:23,289 --> 00:59:21,359

remember Christopher melon stating that

1519

00:59:26,569 --> 00:59:23,299

one of the his one of his biggest

1520

00:59:29,150 --> 00:59:26,579

disappointments uh for the the house

1521

00:59:32,030 --> 00:59:29,160

hearing that happened last year

1522

00:59:35,150 --> 00:59:32,040

um was that more questions weren't asked

1523

00:59:38,450 --> 00:59:35,160

or put to Moultrie and Bray with regard

1524

00:59:41,690 --> 00:59:38,460

to whether there have been any sightings

1525

00:59:44,569 --> 00:59:41,700

uh in space or coming into orbit that

1526
00:59:46,549 --> 00:59:44,579
you know exhibited those those anomalous

1527
00:59:49,910 --> 00:59:46,559
observables right

1528
00:59:52,130 --> 00:59:49,920
um right yeah and along those lines you

1529
00:59:54,289 --> 00:59:52,140
know in this in this

1530
00:59:55,670 --> 00:59:54,299
you know from what you hear behind the

1531
00:59:58,250 --> 00:59:55,680
scenes and what from what you hear from

1532
01:00:00,950 --> 00:59:58,260
your sources you know there's there is

1533
01:00:02,990 --> 01:00:00,960
the sensitivity of of those of Those

1534
01:00:05,870 --> 01:00:03,000
sensors as you're talking about and then

1535
01:00:07,370 --> 01:00:05,880
there's also a lot of talk

1536
01:00:10,430 --> 01:00:07,380
um kind of behind closed doors these

1537
01:00:14,630 --> 01:00:10,440
days about the possibility of recovered

1538
01:00:16,609 --> 01:00:14,640

craft and uh you know and more exotic

1539

01:00:18,530 --> 01:00:16,619

materials and even maybe biological

1540

01:00:21,950 --> 01:00:18,540

specimens and things along those lines

1541

01:00:25,069 --> 01:00:21,960

and folks all the way from say George

1542

01:00:27,410 --> 01:00:25,079

Knapp to uh Leslie Kane and Ralph

1543

01:00:28,730 --> 01:00:27,420

Blumenthal reporting about say Eric

1544

01:00:30,829 --> 01:00:28,740

Davis

1545

01:00:33,890 --> 01:00:30,839

um uh you know in the New York Times

1546

01:00:38,589 --> 01:00:33,900

talking about having briefed folks about

1547

01:00:42,650 --> 01:00:38,599

the the realities in his estimation of

1548

01:00:44,630 --> 01:00:42,660

recovered materials uh not made on this

1549

01:00:46,190 --> 01:00:44,640

Earth or not made by human hands however

1550

01:00:48,890 --> 01:00:46,200

you know whichever quote you want to go

1551
01:00:50,870 --> 01:00:48,900
with that way you know what do you you

1552
01:00:52,549 --> 01:00:50,880
know does that does that area of the

1553
01:00:55,010 --> 01:00:52,559
topic excite you is that so something

1554
01:00:58,069 --> 01:00:55,020
that that you've heard

1555
01:00:59,750 --> 01:00:58,079
um that you've heard talk about and is

1556
01:01:03,109 --> 01:00:59,760
that an angle that you're interested in

1557
01:01:05,750 --> 01:01:03,119
pursuing in the days and months ahead

1558
01:01:08,569 --> 01:01:05,760
yeah I mean look if if there was to be

1559
01:01:09,950 --> 01:01:08,579
some kind of recovered non-uh you know

1560
01:01:11,329 --> 01:01:09,960
non-human

1561
01:01:13,970 --> 01:01:11,339
um vehicle I mean that would be the Holy

1562
01:01:15,170 --> 01:01:13,980
Grail both of the subject in a sense but

1563
01:01:16,910 --> 01:01:15,180

also

1564

01:01:19,069 --> 01:01:16,920

um I guess the Holy Grail would be you

1565

01:01:20,630 --> 01:01:19,079

know The Next Step Beyond that but

1566

01:01:23,089 --> 01:01:20,640

um it would be

1567

01:01:24,530 --> 01:01:23,099

how is it that that's that sort of hits

1568

01:01:26,690 --> 01:01:24,540

the point is how is the National

1569

01:01:28,789 --> 01:01:26,700

Security journalist which I I think

1570

01:01:30,829 --> 01:01:28,799

there's a as much as there is a real

1571

01:01:32,329 --> 01:01:30,839

need for uh caution and prudent

1572

01:01:34,370 --> 01:01:32,339

journalism

1573

01:01:35,930 --> 01:01:34,380

um and and you know that I'm trying to

1574

01:01:37,250 --> 01:01:35,940

take that on myself to slow down a bit

1575

01:01:41,210 --> 01:01:37,260

and try and Dot the eyes and cross the

1576

01:01:41,990 --> 01:01:41,220

t's perhaps um there's also you know a

1577

01:01:43,670 --> 01:01:42,000

great

1578

01:01:45,289 --> 01:01:43,680

um we talk about declining Trust in

1579

01:01:47,750 --> 01:01:45,299

Media but I would say in the National

1580

01:01:49,309 --> 01:01:47,760

Security space it is absurd and pathetic

1581

01:01:51,109 --> 01:01:49,319

quite frankly that more National

1582

01:01:53,089 --> 01:01:51,119

Security journalists don't

1583

01:01:55,789 --> 01:01:53,099

you know take this more seriously and

1584

01:01:57,230 --> 01:01:55,799

engage with it more seriously because

1585

01:01:59,150 --> 01:01:57,240

um yes it's complicated and yes there's

1586

01:02:01,130 --> 01:01:59,160

a huge amount of stigma

1587

01:02:02,809 --> 01:02:01,140

um but something clearly going on and

1588

01:02:04,789 --> 01:02:02,819

they're a hell of a lot better National

1589

01:02:07,250 --> 01:02:04,799

Security journalists than me who must

1590

01:02:08,870 --> 01:02:07,260

have better sources than me who must be

1591

01:02:10,609 --> 01:02:08,880

telling them the same thing my sources

1592

01:02:12,589 --> 01:02:10,619

are telling me to a degree and why

1593

01:02:14,569 --> 01:02:12,599

aren't they writing about it right you

1594

01:02:16,370 --> 01:02:14,579

know to me again stigma is the only

1595

01:02:18,470 --> 01:02:16,380

rational answer

1596

01:02:21,410 --> 01:02:18,480

um but yeah no I mean certainly you know

1597

01:02:24,410 --> 01:02:21,420

it is an area but again you know what I

1598

01:02:26,210 --> 01:02:24,420

would say is my work on that leads me to

1599

01:02:29,569 --> 01:02:26,220

believe there isn't some Grand

1600

01:02:32,510 --> 01:02:29,579

conspiracy at scale in terms of covering

1601
01:02:34,730 --> 01:02:32,520
something up like that because

1602
01:02:36,829 --> 01:02:34,740
um you know there are people that I've

1603
01:02:40,069 --> 01:02:36,839
talked to who would be

1604
01:02:41,270 --> 01:02:40,079
you should know if the US government is

1605
01:02:43,430 --> 01:02:41,280
working on stuff like that because they

1606
01:02:46,430 --> 01:02:43,440
would have a reason to know

1607
01:02:47,870 --> 01:02:46,440
um but it also pushes me to think if

1608
01:02:50,809 --> 01:02:47,880
there is something there and again you

1609
01:02:51,950 --> 01:02:50,819
know obviously I I think you know there

1610
01:02:54,349 --> 01:02:51,960
are

1611
01:02:56,089 --> 01:02:54,359
people in positions who you know might

1612
01:02:58,069 --> 01:02:56,099
know who are saying they're they're you

1613
01:02:59,690 --> 01:02:58,079

know is something there that it that it

1614

01:03:01,670 --> 01:02:59,700

would be pushed to

1615

01:03:04,130 --> 01:03:01,680

um contractors and and pushed outside

1616

01:03:05,750 --> 01:03:04,140

the normal reporting chains which is why

1617

01:03:08,329 --> 01:03:05,760

I think you see Congress working on that

1618

01:03:10,370 --> 01:03:08,339

as well uh because that is how you would

1619

01:03:14,750 --> 01:03:10,380

hide something

1620

01:03:17,089 --> 01:03:14,760

um from disclosure and

1621

01:03:17,990 --> 01:03:17,099

and obviously the extreme sensitivity of

1622

01:03:20,150 --> 01:03:18,000

it

1623

01:03:21,890 --> 01:03:20,160

um you know perhaps would motivate you

1624

01:03:24,349 --> 01:03:21,900

do that I mean but again you need that

1625

01:03:26,569 --> 01:03:24,359

also goes back to the legal

1626

01:03:27,890 --> 01:03:26,579

um side of this that you know a certain

1627

01:03:31,190 --> 01:03:27,900

point people

1628

01:03:33,109 --> 01:03:31,200

you know I think probably and again you

1629

01:03:34,730 --> 01:03:33,119

know to say this is my kind of just

1630

01:03:36,410 --> 01:03:34,740

talking off the cuff here versus you

1631

01:03:38,569 --> 01:03:36,420

know reporting piece I mean my instinct

1632

01:03:41,329 --> 01:03:38,579

tells me that people have lied you know

1633

01:03:44,329 --> 01:03:41,339

to Congress to conceal things

1634

01:03:47,990 --> 01:03:44,339

um uh and and so you need to provide a

1635

01:03:49,970 --> 01:03:48,000

mechanism for them to be able to to

1636

01:03:51,589 --> 01:03:49,980

um start telling the truth in a way that

1637

01:03:53,030 --> 01:03:51,599

facilitates them not going to federal

1638

01:03:55,970 --> 01:03:53,040

prison

1639

01:03:58,309 --> 01:03:55,980

um and and and I think that process is

1640

01:04:00,410 --> 01:03:58,319

is underway and I also think what's

1641

01:04:01,670 --> 01:04:00,420

what's you know notable we talked just

1642

01:04:04,490 --> 01:04:01,680

back to just so people can understand

1643

01:04:05,870 --> 01:04:04,500

the idea of you know public servants

1644

01:04:08,150 --> 01:04:05,880

versus

1645

01:04:11,510 --> 01:04:08,160

um you know

1646

01:04:13,670 --> 01:04:11,520

um people covering things up you know

1647

01:04:15,890 --> 01:04:13,680

um Bray you know oh and I you know has

1648

01:04:17,630 --> 01:04:15,900

really fantastic reputation in terms of

1649

01:04:19,250 --> 01:04:17,640

you know really important things for the

1650

01:04:21,289 --> 01:04:19,260

nation because very dedicated public

1651

01:04:23,150 --> 01:04:21,299

servant but I think his in particip with

1652

01:04:25,490 --> 01:04:23,160

this is probably you know I got other

1653

01:04:27,410 --> 01:04:25,500

stuff going on that is more again war

1654

01:04:29,329 --> 01:04:27,420

with Taiwan coming

1655

01:04:32,390 --> 01:04:29,339

um same with the Navy you know they want

1656

01:04:34,430 --> 01:04:32,400

to focus on that immediate concern and

1657

01:04:38,210 --> 01:04:34,440

part of the way they can do that without

1658

01:04:40,069 --> 01:04:38,220

lying to Congress is

1659

01:04:42,530 --> 01:04:40,079

essentially kind of relatively

1660

01:04:44,089 --> 01:04:42,540

insulating themselves from you know the

1661

01:04:45,890 --> 01:04:44,099

subject area and I think a great example

1662

01:04:47,329 --> 01:04:45,900

we saw of that was I think it was

1663

01:04:49,490 --> 01:04:47,339

Gallagher who asked the question with

1664

01:04:50,750 --> 01:04:49,500

the Maelstrom incidents right they

1665

01:04:53,089 --> 01:04:50,760

hadn't even heard

1666

01:04:55,190 --> 01:04:53,099

you know and that's that's took I was

1667

01:04:56,809 --> 01:04:55,200

like how could you not have heard of

1668

01:04:58,190 --> 01:04:56,819

that if you were sort of running this

1669

01:05:00,950 --> 01:04:58,200

effort and I think part of that is is

1670

01:05:02,569 --> 01:05:00,960

quite deliberate it's like I just tell

1671

01:05:06,370 --> 01:05:02,579

me what I absolutely need to know but

1672

01:05:08,990 --> 01:05:06,380

keep this [h__h] away from me because

1673

01:05:11,390 --> 01:05:09,000

and again that that doesn't mean this

1674

01:05:12,789 --> 01:05:11,400

and Grand conspiracy even though you

1675

01:05:14,690 --> 01:05:12,799

know there's there are probably

1676

01:05:16,309 --> 01:05:14,700

conspiratorial elements to the history

1677

01:05:18,650 --> 01:05:16,319

of this

1678

01:05:20,150 --> 01:05:18,660

um that that you know we will that we're

1679

01:05:22,190 --> 01:05:20,160

at the beginning of kind of getting to

1680

01:05:23,870 --> 01:05:22,200

the bottom of yeah sure I mean just the

1681

01:05:25,010 --> 01:05:23,880

fact that you know like you stated you

1682

01:05:26,690 --> 01:05:25,020

know there's videos and other

1683

01:05:28,309 --> 01:05:26,700

photography that could be shown if the

1684

01:05:31,970 --> 01:05:28,319

right steps were taken but they're not I

1685

01:05:35,049 --> 01:05:31,980

mean that kind of lends Credence to

1686

01:05:37,370 --> 01:05:35,059

there's a cover-up

1687

01:05:38,750 --> 01:05:37,380

deal with that I mean look I mean that I

1688

01:05:41,150 --> 01:05:38,760

mean it depends I suppose how you

1689

01:05:43,490 --> 01:05:41,160

consider the cover-up I guess I I to me

1690

01:05:46,789 --> 01:05:43,500

cover a business of you know

1691

01:05:48,589 --> 01:05:46,799

a great perception uh I guess rather

1692

01:05:51,109 --> 01:05:48,599

than a bureaucratic impulse I mean a lot

1693

01:05:53,150 --> 01:05:51,119

of stuff they choose not to declassify

1694

01:05:55,670 --> 01:05:53,160

all talk types of issues that go beyond

1695

01:05:57,589 --> 01:05:55,680

this but it was notable in that briefing

1696

01:05:59,930 --> 01:05:57,599

right where they produced that stupid

1697

01:06:02,870 --> 01:05:59,940

video of you could even see what was

1698

01:06:04,910 --> 01:06:02,880

flying by and and the idea and I had

1699

01:06:06,950 --> 01:06:04,920

multiple people tell me who were mad

1700

01:06:08,990 --> 01:06:06,960

right you know military people you know

1701

01:06:10,970 --> 01:06:09,000

especially military people now who are

1702

01:06:13,730 --> 01:06:10,980

pissed off because they've seen things

1703

01:06:15,710 --> 01:06:13,740

or people who've seen the imagery and

1704

01:06:17,990 --> 01:06:15,720

you know I suppose growing up in the UK

1705

01:06:19,190 --> 01:06:18,000

I you know have a slightly dark sense of

1706

01:06:23,030 --> 01:06:19,200

humor but

1707

01:06:24,829 --> 01:06:23,040

um you know my uh America especially my

1708

01:06:26,630 --> 01:06:24,839

American it was Korean military

1709

01:06:28,549 --> 01:06:26,640

grandfather is still alive fortunately

1710

01:06:30,470 --> 01:06:28,559

always tells me get off that subject

1711

01:06:32,089 --> 01:06:30,480

that's a bunch of bull I'm like no

1712

01:06:33,250 --> 01:06:32,099

grandpa you know I don't think it is but

1713

01:06:36,170 --> 01:06:33,260

you know anyway

1714

01:06:38,029 --> 01:06:36,180

that little addicted but but

1715

01:06:39,890 --> 01:06:38,039

um you know they had a lot of people

1716

01:06:41,089 --> 01:06:39,900

when they produced that video to say oh

1717

01:06:42,950 --> 01:06:41,099

this is what we're dealing with and it's

1718

01:06:45,230 --> 01:06:42,960

complicated do you know what that is

1719

01:06:47,930 --> 01:06:45,240

because Rita give me a break that that

1720

01:06:51,710 --> 01:06:47,940

was the the best imagery event not even

1721

01:06:53,210 --> 01:06:51,720

close uh you know and and you know you

1722

01:06:55,309 --> 01:06:53,220

hear all kinds of stories about things

1723

01:06:57,950 --> 01:06:55,319

the scene but you know there were there

1724

01:06:59,569 --> 01:06:57,960

are quite a few videos that that you

1725

01:07:01,730 --> 01:06:59,579

know have now been put in more stricter

1726

01:07:05,230 --> 01:07:01,740

places when they weren't originally

1727

01:07:08,569 --> 01:07:05,240

right and that is a cover-up yeah

1728

01:07:12,890 --> 01:07:08,579

I mean it's a kind of interpretation but

1729

01:07:14,329 --> 01:07:12,900

yeah that but I I do you know again I it

1730

01:07:16,490 --> 01:07:14,339

comes back to

1731

01:07:17,450 --> 01:07:16,500

um Congress you know has their teeth in

1732

01:07:20,870 --> 01:07:17,460

this now

1733

01:07:23,029 --> 01:07:20,880

um yeah I'm gonna let go along along

1734

01:07:24,470 --> 01:07:23,039

those lines uh in terms of a cover-up

1735

01:07:25,910 --> 01:07:24,480

and in terms of what you were talking

1736

01:07:28,549 --> 01:07:25,920

about earlier with regard to over

1737

01:07:30,650 --> 01:07:28,559

classification things along those lines

1738

01:07:33,170 --> 01:07:30,660

you know people

1739

01:07:35,870 --> 01:07:33,180

um I've heard many journalists who very

1740

01:07:37,910 --> 01:07:35,880

well in terms of intentioned journalists

1741

01:07:40,430 --> 01:07:37,920

um say for example Ross Coulter folks

1742

01:07:42,109 --> 01:07:40,440

like that talking about you know the

1743

01:07:43,670 --> 01:07:42,119

National Security concerns I've heard

1744

01:07:45,710 --> 01:07:43,680

you talking about the National Security

1745

01:07:48,049 --> 01:07:45,720

concerns before as well and you know

1746

01:07:50,569 --> 01:07:48,059

it's something that I I can see is

1747

01:07:52,370 --> 01:07:50,579

really drilled into for good reason

1748

01:07:55,730 --> 01:07:52,380

um mainstream journalists with with

1749

01:07:57,650 --> 01:07:55,740

regard to you know making sure that your

1750

01:07:59,630 --> 01:07:57,660

reporting doesn't compromise National

1751

01:08:03,589 --> 01:07:59,640

Security and that's something that is

1752

01:08:05,930 --> 01:08:03,599

often you know that that there is a

1753

01:08:09,289 --> 01:08:05,940

there can be a bit of a gray area there

1754

01:08:11,089 --> 01:08:09,299

you know historically with regard to you

1755

01:08:12,770 --> 01:08:11,099

know there's the old say like project

1756

01:08:14,150 --> 01:08:12,780

Mockingbird or things like that people

1757

01:08:16,930 --> 01:08:14,160

were talking about that earlier in the

1758

01:08:19,849 --> 01:08:16,940

chat that that there's the possibility

1759

01:08:23,030 --> 01:08:19,859

that that kind of tacit agreement

1760

01:08:25,550 --> 01:08:23,040

between journalists or mainstream media

1761

01:08:28,669 --> 01:08:25,560

organizations and say the National

1762

01:08:30,890 --> 01:08:28,679

Security apparatus to not reveal sources

1763

01:08:32,990 --> 01:08:30,900

and methods to not reveal classified

1764

01:08:36,050 --> 01:08:33,000

materials and things like that well if

1765

01:08:38,150 --> 01:08:36,060

things are being over classified or if

1766

01:08:40,370 --> 01:08:38,160

there's a gray area of that

1767

01:08:42,709 --> 01:08:40,380

classification have you do you think

1768

01:08:45,769 --> 01:08:42,719

that there's the possibility or the

1769

01:08:48,709 --> 01:08:45,779

reality and or have you experienced ever

1770

01:08:51,050 --> 01:08:48,719

a situation where you felt like

1771

01:08:53,030 --> 01:08:51,060

that there was undue pressure where

1772

01:08:55,150 --> 01:08:53,040

something was said to be a national

1773

01:08:57,590 --> 01:08:55,160

security concern or said to be

1774

01:08:58,910 --> 01:08:57,600

classified and it seemed really seemed

1775

01:09:01,610 --> 01:08:58,920

like something that should be reported

1776

01:09:06,410 --> 01:09:04,010

yes I mean you know that that happens

1777

01:09:07,669 --> 01:09:06,420

and you've obviously go to be you know

1778

01:09:09,349 --> 01:09:07,679

which I think you're hinting at very

1779

01:09:12,169 --> 01:09:09,359

politely you also have to be aware as a

1780

01:09:14,450 --> 01:09:12,179

journalist to not be co-opted right that

1781

01:09:16,610 --> 01:09:14,460

in return for Access and Prestige and

1782

01:09:18,829 --> 01:09:16,620

being invited to

1783

01:09:22,910 --> 01:09:18,839

you know parties

1784

01:09:26,150 --> 01:09:22,920

um uh you you know you've got like and

1785

01:09:27,769 --> 01:09:26,160

I'll give you well it does so there was

1786

01:09:29,510 --> 01:09:27,779

the the CIA had their Christmas party

1787

01:09:30,650 --> 01:09:29,520

which is Saturday I was not invited to

1788

01:09:32,870 --> 01:09:30,660

even though I thought I had a good

1789

01:09:33,890 --> 01:09:32,880

rapport with their Pub press on but I'm

1790

01:09:36,110 --> 01:09:33,900

pretty sure it's because I've been

1791

01:09:37,789 --> 01:09:36,120

writing on you know Havana syndrome

1792

01:09:41,269 --> 01:09:37,799

stuff and that pissed them off and you

1793

01:09:43,189 --> 01:09:41,279

know so you know but but I think you I

1794

01:09:46,010 --> 01:09:43,199

mean that's that's a silly example but

1795

01:09:48,769 --> 01:09:46,020

but you know access does go in in

1796

01:09:50,269 --> 01:09:48,779

in alongside

1797

01:09:53,390 --> 01:09:50,279

um and you know stories that they can

1798

01:09:55,790 --> 01:09:53,400

give you go alongside you keeping people

1799

01:09:58,010 --> 01:09:55,800

happy I think my Approach though to the

1800

01:10:00,110 --> 01:09:58,020

subject is try and focus on or any

1801

01:10:02,990 --> 01:10:00,120

national security subject is there a

1802

01:10:04,850 --> 01:10:03,000

threat to you know critical you know you

1803

01:10:06,709 --> 01:10:04,860

have to be decide for yourself National

1804

01:10:08,930 --> 01:10:06,719

Security interests is it a legitimate

1805

01:10:11,689 --> 01:10:08,940

concern and if you were talking about on

1806

01:10:12,530 --> 01:10:11,699

this subject you know where

1807

01:10:15,590 --> 01:10:12,540

um

1808

01:10:18,890 --> 01:10:15,600

certain you know sent New Wave you know

1809

01:10:20,930 --> 01:10:18,900

next Generation sensor systems uh stuff

1810

01:10:24,410 --> 01:10:20,940

that we use to track Hypersonic light

1811

01:10:26,209 --> 01:10:24,420

Vehicles you know how some of that works

1812

01:10:27,649 --> 01:10:26,219

and where it is you know that's

1813

01:10:30,290 --> 01:10:27,659

legitimate I think that you would want

1814

01:10:32,750 --> 01:10:30,300

to be very cautious about that

1815

01:10:35,330 --> 01:10:32,760

um even though there are clear you know

1816

01:10:37,310 --> 01:10:35,340

dividends because it it could be

1817

01:10:39,490 --> 01:10:37,320

you know you you write about that thing

1818

01:10:43,070 --> 01:10:39,500

you could really you know endanger

1819

01:10:45,110 --> 01:10:43,080

American lives um and and National

1820

01:10:46,910 --> 01:10:45,120

Security in the most you know against

1821

01:10:48,590 --> 01:10:46,920

very bad people and the Russians of the

1822

01:10:51,410 --> 01:10:48,600

Chinese government are very bad people

1823

01:10:53,689 --> 01:10:51,420

uh and we do not want them so this is my

1824

01:10:57,470 --> 01:10:53,699

phone getting off here on me I apologize

1825

01:10:59,209 --> 01:10:57,480

uh we do not want them

1826

01:11:02,209 --> 01:10:59,219

you know I would say to win

1827

01:11:03,169 --> 01:11:02,219

um yeah you know but they're also

1828

01:11:05,090 --> 01:11:03,179

um

1829

01:11:06,530 --> 01:11:05,100

you know I've

1830

01:11:07,910 --> 01:11:06,540

um

1831

01:11:09,410 --> 01:11:07,920

you know I think on this subject right

1832

01:11:10,610 --> 01:11:09,420

I've written about stuff and actually in

1833

01:11:12,649 --> 01:11:10,620

the nuclear connection which is

1834

01:11:15,649 --> 01:11:12,659

classified you know it was top secret

1835

01:11:17,750 --> 01:11:15,659

you know um I'll write about that I you

1836

01:11:19,430 --> 01:11:17,760

know some of the you know intelligence

1837

01:11:22,250 --> 01:11:19,440

World stuff I do on the Russians you

1838

01:11:24,290 --> 01:11:22,260

know is very classified you know but

1839

01:11:29,450 --> 01:11:24,300

you've got to just decide

1840

01:11:31,130 --> 01:11:29,460

um what's the um you know what's the uh

1841

01:11:32,930 --> 01:11:31,140

the right balance yeah and you know

1842

01:11:34,790 --> 01:11:32,940

ultimately it's in the eye of the

1843

01:11:36,709 --> 01:11:34,800

beholder and I appreciate that people

1844

01:11:38,630 --> 01:11:36,719

disagree

1845

01:11:41,390 --> 01:11:38,640

um I just what I would say though on

1846

01:11:42,709 --> 01:11:41,400

this subject I you know there is a you

1847

01:11:44,090 --> 01:11:42,719

know people don't want you know the

1848

01:11:46,550 --> 01:11:44,100

government certainly since more has come

1849

01:11:48,530 --> 01:11:46,560

out again I think it tends to be for the

1850

01:11:51,590 --> 01:11:48,540

reasons of bureaucracy I don't want to

1851

01:11:52,910 --> 01:11:51,600

deal with it but but you know it is not

1852

01:11:55,070 --> 01:11:52,920

writing about this subject it's not

1853

01:11:57,649 --> 01:11:55,080

something that wins your friends in the

1854

01:12:00,110 --> 01:11:57,659

National Security kind of well but I'm

1855

01:12:02,330 --> 01:12:00,120

still gonna you know keep doing on it

1856

01:12:04,430 --> 01:12:02,340

because it is the most critical

1857

01:12:07,370 --> 01:12:04,440

potentially

1858

01:12:08,470 --> 01:12:07,380

I mean issue not just of our time but of

1859

01:12:10,850 --> 01:12:08,480

all time

1860

01:12:13,790 --> 01:12:10,860

and if journalists have one

1861

01:12:17,090 --> 01:12:13,800

responsibility surely it is too

1862

01:12:18,890 --> 01:12:17,100

you know I I do yeah I do find it very

1863

01:12:20,810 --> 01:12:18,900

again going back to because it's not

1864

01:12:22,870 --> 01:12:20,820

just me right watching a video and sort

1865

01:12:25,990 --> 01:12:22,880

of you know

1866

01:12:28,430 --> 01:12:26,000

Christmas parties would be amazing

1867

01:12:29,689 --> 01:12:28,440

but again

1868

01:12:31,310 --> 01:12:29,699

against the great thing as well there

1869

01:12:33,590 --> 01:12:31,320

are a lot of people inside the

1870

01:12:35,209 --> 01:12:33,600

bureaucracy who you know it's not me

1871

01:12:38,090 --> 01:12:35,219

just plucking this out of the air right

1872

01:12:40,189 --> 01:12:38,100

it's people that you know you you

1873

01:12:41,689 --> 01:12:40,199

worked hard to develop to Source

1874

01:12:43,070 --> 01:12:41,699

relationship with who are telling you

1875

01:12:44,810 --> 01:12:43,080

this stuff and you trust them and then

1876

01:12:46,370 --> 01:12:44,820

you and the descriptions align and

1877

01:12:48,410 --> 01:12:46,380

people who don't know each other saying

1878

01:12:50,270 --> 01:12:48,420

the same thing and people who don't like

1879

01:12:51,950 --> 01:12:50,280

certain people who are more

1880

01:12:53,209 --> 01:12:51,960

public-facing in this field who used to

1881

01:12:55,010 --> 01:12:53,219

be in the government saying the same

1882

01:12:56,870 --> 01:12:55,020

thing as them and people who do like

1883

01:12:59,450 --> 01:12:56,880

them today so you know you've got to be

1884

01:13:01,610 --> 01:12:59,460

you know there's this is not just

1885

01:13:03,530 --> 01:13:01,620

um and as I say I you know

1886

01:13:04,669 --> 01:13:03,540

that wasn't false humility there are a

1887

01:13:07,189 --> 01:13:04,679

lot of better National Security

1888

01:13:10,430 --> 01:13:07,199

journalists than me who have to be told

1889

01:13:12,410 --> 01:13:10,440

by sources this stuff and I I just have

1890

01:13:16,010 --> 01:13:12,420

to assume they're just deciding yeah I

1891

01:13:18,530 --> 01:13:16,020

don't want to get into that stuff yeah

1892

01:13:20,510 --> 01:13:18,540

yeah well I appreciate all your work and

1893

01:13:22,490 --> 01:13:20,520

your hard work and doing this because

1894

01:13:25,370 --> 01:13:22,500

um there are not many

1895

01:13:27,530 --> 01:13:25,380

um talented journalists attacking this

1896

01:13:30,290 --> 01:13:27,540

subject I mean for instance NDA got past

1897

01:13:32,750 --> 01:13:30,300

30 some pages of UAP language

1898

01:13:34,729 --> 01:13:32,760

law you know for the first time ever in

1899

01:13:37,610 --> 01:13:34,739

history and there's not a peep on that

1900

01:13:40,250 --> 01:13:37,620

passing from any major media Network and

1901

01:13:42,470 --> 01:13:40,260

it's just ridiculous so I'm grateful

1902

01:13:44,450 --> 01:13:42,480

someone like you but it will so thank

1903

01:13:46,310 --> 01:13:44,460

you and look and I know as well there

1904

01:13:47,510 --> 01:13:46,320

are a lot of people

1905

01:13:49,970 --> 01:13:47,520

um

1906

01:13:51,410 --> 01:13:49,980

you know that such as yourselves who are

1907

01:13:53,270 --> 01:13:51,420

pushing this and they're doing it

1908

01:13:55,910 --> 01:13:53,280

incredibly some of the research that you

1909

01:13:57,590 --> 01:13:55,920

know people who are not I guess formal

1910

01:13:59,330 --> 01:13:57,600

journalists are doing uh is

1911

01:14:00,770 --> 01:13:59,340

extraordinary and frankly that's one

1912

01:14:03,830 --> 01:14:00,780

thing I you know should say I probably

1913

01:14:05,689 --> 01:14:03,840

haven't said enough do disagree with

1914

01:14:07,130 --> 01:14:05,699

um you know some of the journalists

1915

01:14:08,810 --> 01:14:07,140

who've been doing this along with me

1916

01:14:11,689 --> 01:14:08,820

some of their assessments

1917

01:14:14,270 --> 01:14:11,699

how they approach it sometimes but you

1918

01:14:16,430 --> 01:14:14,280

know you are

1919

01:14:18,709 --> 01:14:16,440

um this extraordinary benefit at least

1920

01:14:20,330 --> 01:14:18,719

in terms of you know stuff that you can

1921

01:14:22,850 --> 01:14:20,340

dive into

1922

01:14:24,950 --> 01:14:22,860

um of you know researchers general you

1923

01:14:26,090 --> 01:14:24,960

know George Knapp obviously you know

1924

01:14:27,830 --> 01:14:26,100

um he would be one of the people I would

1925

01:14:29,870 --> 01:14:27,840

say I do have some some pretty strong

1926

01:14:31,790 --> 01:14:29,880

disagreements with him on some stuff but

1927

01:14:33,590 --> 01:14:31,800

look he's been doing this a hell of a

1928

01:14:35,930 --> 01:14:33,600

lot longer and and the existing even if

1929

01:14:38,870 --> 01:14:35,940

you disagree with his conclusions from

1930

01:14:41,510 --> 01:14:38,880

reporting or or reporting and others you

1931

01:14:44,510 --> 01:14:41,520

know like him and there's a wealth of

1932

01:14:46,669 --> 01:14:44,520

you know documentation and and Freedom

1933

01:14:49,790 --> 01:14:46,679

of Information required you know and and

1934

01:14:52,430 --> 01:14:49,800

sort of things to think about I mean

1935

01:14:53,510 --> 01:14:52,440

um you know row at Hastings UFOs and

1936

01:14:56,750 --> 01:14:53,520

nukes

1937

01:14:58,370 --> 01:14:56,760

um you know uh people who are now

1938

01:15:00,830 --> 01:14:58,380

um obviously have died right because

1939

01:15:03,290 --> 01:15:00,840

this has been going on for a while so no

1940

01:15:08,510 --> 01:15:03,300

I mean I'm very lucky and you know I I I

1941

01:15:10,850 --> 01:15:08,520

I do need to give more uh correct to you

1942

01:15:12,770 --> 01:15:10,860

know well that's well yeah along those

1943

01:15:15,410 --> 01:15:12,780

lines so you just you're talking about

1944

01:15:17,750 --> 01:15:15,420

nap and Robert Hastings you know I've

1945

01:15:20,270 --> 01:15:17,760

heard you rattle off cases like Socorro

1946

01:15:22,189 --> 01:15:20,280

and aerial School in such a way that I

1947

01:15:24,530 --> 01:15:22,199

it's clear that you've done some really

1948

01:15:26,030 --> 01:15:24,540

deep dives into this topic

1949

01:15:29,209 --> 01:15:26,040

um would you mind mentioning some of

1950

01:15:31,250 --> 01:15:29,219

your other favorite writers researchers

1951

01:15:34,850 --> 01:15:31,260

and historians maybe it's like starting

1952

01:15:37,669 --> 01:15:34,860

with the ogs from way back and well you

1953

01:15:38,450 --> 01:15:37,679

know I mean the the

1954

01:15:41,390 --> 01:15:38,460

um

1955

01:15:43,610 --> 01:15:41,400

and I one of the things that is

1956

01:15:44,870 --> 01:15:43,620

interesting with this is that where you

1957

01:15:46,790 --> 01:15:44,880

see

1958

01:15:49,610 --> 01:15:46,800

um

1959

01:15:51,950 --> 01:15:49,620

you know just the I'm having a mind

1960

01:15:52,970 --> 01:15:51,960

blanket who is the gentleman who

1961

01:15:55,669 --> 01:15:52,980

um

1962

01:15:58,189 --> 01:15:55,679

sadly had a heart attack in I don't know

1963

01:16:01,070 --> 01:15:58,199

10 15 years ago glasses I'm having a

1964

01:16:04,189 --> 01:16:01,080

mind blank I should know famous UFO

1965

01:16:06,050 --> 01:16:04,199

ufologist Stephen Friedman sounds pretty

1966

01:16:07,970 --> 01:16:06,060

no yeah exactly of course how do I have

1967

01:16:09,350 --> 01:16:07,980

my birthday you know I I you know and

1968

01:16:11,149 --> 01:16:09,360

again I'm looking you don't have to

1969

01:16:12,350 --> 01:16:11,159

agree with everything people say in this

1970

01:16:15,229 --> 01:16:12,360

stuff but when they're talking about

1971

01:16:18,649 --> 01:16:15,239

cases and doing the writing and uh

1972

01:16:20,330 --> 01:16:18,659

absolutely you know you know it it's uh

1973

01:16:21,649 --> 01:16:20,340

it's extremely about I mean I have a

1974

01:16:24,110 --> 01:16:21,659

particularly

1975

01:16:26,930 --> 01:16:24,120

um fond view of uh Robert Hastings just

1976

01:16:29,570 --> 01:16:26,940

because I think you know that

1977

01:16:31,550 --> 01:16:29,580

um you know book you know just the the

1978

01:16:33,530 --> 01:16:31,560

level of you know detail he's gone into

1979

01:16:35,689 --> 01:16:33,540

there and the level of stigma that he

1980

01:16:37,310 --> 01:16:35,699

had to I could winch about stigma now is

1981

01:16:39,770 --> 01:16:37,320

nothing compared to what it used to be

1982

01:16:42,169 --> 01:16:39,780

and it is Shifting and and what I hope

1983

01:16:44,090 --> 01:16:42,179

will happen actually

1984

01:16:45,649 --> 01:16:44,100

um and certainly I'm going to make sure

1985

01:16:47,930 --> 01:16:45,659

it happens is when

1986

01:16:49,729 --> 01:16:47,940

you know five or ten years from now and

1987

01:16:52,189 --> 01:16:49,739

I do think it'll be you know in that

1988

01:16:54,470 --> 01:16:52,199

window and this gets a lot more media

1989

01:16:56,630 --> 01:16:54,480

attention because it is seen as more

1990

01:16:59,450 --> 01:16:56,640

credible and less stigma people remember

1991

01:17:01,970 --> 01:16:59,460

that there were you know

1992

01:17:03,470 --> 01:17:01,980

people being willing to take it on when

1993

01:17:06,470 --> 01:17:03,480

it was less

1994

01:17:09,470 --> 01:17:06,480

um you know seen as a less uh exciting

1995

01:17:11,390 --> 01:17:09,480

and legitimate uh Avenue to cover but

1996

01:17:13,310 --> 01:17:11,400

but again one of the beautiful things

1997

01:17:15,770 --> 01:17:13,320

about this subject matter is when you

1998

01:17:19,250 --> 01:17:17,750

um you know conclusions you know

1999

01:17:21,709 --> 01:17:19,260

credible Witnesses whether we think you

2000

01:17:23,450 --> 01:17:21,719

know there's a lot of and you know some

2001
01:17:25,310 --> 01:17:23,460
of the videos some of the channels that

2002
01:17:26,870 --> 01:17:25,320
people run on YouTube and Reddit or

2003
01:17:29,209 --> 01:17:26,880
whatever and

2004
01:17:30,410 --> 01:17:29,219
um you know goes like yourselves like

2005
01:17:32,450 --> 01:17:30,420
doing

2006
01:17:35,209 --> 01:17:32,460
um you know just just covering this and

2007
01:17:36,709 --> 01:17:35,219
bringing up accounts like when you see

2008
01:17:38,030 --> 01:17:36,719
you know but the school thing is

2009
01:17:40,070 --> 01:17:38,040
fascinating I mean I know what the hell

2010
01:17:41,570 --> 01:17:40,080
is going on there but absolutely when

2011
01:17:44,390 --> 01:17:41,580
you have the same type of witness

2012
01:17:47,450 --> 01:17:44,400
experience over multiple decades you

2013
01:17:49,910 --> 01:17:47,460

know in Wales in the UK and or it's got

2014

01:17:52,370 --> 01:17:49,920

like a Melbourne Australia you know

2015

01:17:55,310 --> 01:17:52,380

Ariel you know very similar descriptions

2016

01:17:56,630 --> 01:17:55,320

by mass Witnesses

2017

01:17:58,729 --> 01:17:56,640

um you know the football stadium

2018

01:18:00,770 --> 01:17:58,739

incident in Italy where there's you know

2019

01:18:03,110 --> 01:18:00,780

thousands of people now maybe this is

2020

01:18:05,810 --> 01:18:03,120

mass hallucination and some kind of you

2021

01:18:08,149 --> 01:18:05,820

know thing that's great but maybe it's

2022

01:18:09,950 --> 01:18:08,159

not and frankly I would say there's a

2023

01:18:12,050 --> 01:18:09,960

pretty you know balancing probabilities

2024

01:18:14,390 --> 01:18:12,060

when you attend with other kind of

2025

01:18:16,310 --> 01:18:14,400

witness reports I you know it's more

2026

01:18:17,630 --> 01:18:16,320

likely I would say that it's not mass

2027

01:18:19,669 --> 01:18:17,640

hallucination

2028

01:18:22,189 --> 01:18:19,679

um and you know but just being able to

2029

01:18:23,630 --> 01:18:22,199

kind of dive into that is

2030

01:18:26,270 --> 01:18:23,640

um you know I'm passionate obviously

2031

01:18:27,590 --> 01:18:26,280

about the subject at a you know personal

2032

01:18:29,450 --> 01:18:27,600

level but

2033

01:18:32,510 --> 01:18:29,460

um it's certainly you know the work that

2034

01:18:35,810 --> 01:18:32,520

others have done before makes you know

2035

01:18:39,350 --> 01:18:35,820

it a hell of a lot easier for me

2036

01:18:41,510 --> 01:18:39,360

um now I think you hit it on the head

2037

01:18:42,950 --> 01:18:41,520

too you don't have to necessarily agree

2038

01:18:45,770 --> 01:18:42,960

with somebody's

2039

01:18:47,630 --> 01:18:45,780

um you know a final explanation or

2040

01:18:49,189 --> 01:18:47,640

synopsis because let's get real how do

2041

01:18:52,070 --> 01:18:49,199

they know they don't know they don't

2042

01:18:53,810 --> 01:18:52,080

know if it's alien or this or that but

2043

01:18:55,550 --> 01:18:53,820

what they do know are the facts that

2044

01:18:58,010 --> 01:18:55,560

this happened this was reported these

2045

01:18:59,450 --> 01:18:58,020

people say this you know and you can

2046

01:19:01,010 --> 01:18:59,460

catch the patterns around the country

2047

01:19:02,510 --> 01:19:01,020

with the nuclear stuff catch the

2048

01:19:05,209 --> 01:19:02,520

patterns at all the different facilities

2049

01:19:06,950 --> 01:19:05,219

it's documented within Project Blue Book

2050

01:19:09,169 --> 01:19:06,960

you can look at the documents in the

2051

01:19:12,350 --> 01:19:09,179

archives you know so all that is there

2052

01:19:13,669 --> 01:19:12,360

and factual to really speak to the fact

2053

01:19:17,330 --> 01:19:13,679

that something

2054

01:19:18,950 --> 01:19:17,340

is happening yeah and and and yeah and I

2055

01:19:21,110 --> 01:19:18,960

I do I mean I think the fundamental

2056

01:19:23,870 --> 01:19:21,120

things you know just like for me is like

2057

01:19:25,610 --> 01:19:23,880

you know that again that you are dealing

2058

01:19:28,790 --> 01:19:25,620

with intelligently controlled Vehicles

2059

01:19:30,770 --> 01:19:28,800

here and that are not you know an earth

2060

01:19:33,229 --> 01:19:30,780

Nation operating them

2061

01:19:35,030 --> 01:19:33,239

um in this Exquisite limited case pool

2062

01:19:37,070 --> 01:19:35,040

that has been going on at least since

2063

01:19:38,810 --> 01:19:37,080

you know the 40s that there is a nuclear

2064

01:19:41,630 --> 01:19:38,820

connection

2065

01:19:42,770 --> 01:19:41,640

um that it is intelligently controlled

2066

01:19:44,209 --> 01:19:42,780

right when you talk to some of the

2067

01:19:46,669 --> 01:19:44,219

people you know who are not out in the

2068

01:19:48,410 --> 01:19:46,679

public and they will describe how these

2069

01:19:50,149 --> 01:19:48,420

things react to difference you know so I

2070

01:19:52,669 --> 01:19:50,159

talked a little bit about earlier senses

2071

01:19:55,010 --> 01:19:52,679

or maneuvering against them or you know

2072

01:19:56,870 --> 01:19:55,020

that there's and how they will approach

2073

01:20:00,709 --> 01:19:56,880

some pop out of nowhere you know that's

2074

01:20:03,649 --> 01:20:00,719

almost messaging uh a gaming element

2075

01:20:05,330 --> 01:20:03,659

um you know like so there's you know but

2076

01:20:08,510 --> 01:20:05,340

that stuff is fascinating

2077

01:20:09,410 --> 01:20:08,520

um and you know at a minimum worthy of

2078

01:20:12,470 --> 01:20:09,420

um

2079

01:20:15,530 --> 01:20:12,480

I think attention yeah more than a

2080

01:20:21,550 --> 01:20:19,370

all three of us for sure absolutely well

2081

01:20:23,930 --> 01:20:21,560

thank you so much for your time

2082

01:20:27,290 --> 01:20:23,940

absolutely amazing and really wonderful

2083

01:20:28,430 --> 01:20:27,300

to be able to pick your brain and have a

2084

01:20:30,410 --> 01:20:28,440

nice back and forth today it's

2085

01:20:31,790 --> 01:20:30,420

absolutely fantastic no and this is

2086

01:20:33,770 --> 01:20:31,800

great as well and I you know I I

2087

01:20:36,050 --> 01:20:33,780

appreciate how

2088

01:20:39,229 --> 01:20:36,060

um you know you guys obviously you know

2089

01:20:40,790 --> 01:20:39,239

uh I'll watch the you know the show

2090

01:20:42,770 --> 01:20:40,800

before we were talking about my drone

2091

01:20:44,330 --> 01:20:42,780

article and you know obviously this is

2092

01:20:46,970 --> 01:20:44,340

the great thing is the passion in the

2093

01:20:48,290 --> 01:20:46,980

subject and you know really

2094

01:20:49,850 --> 01:20:48,300

um you know obviously there are some

2095

01:20:51,410 --> 01:20:49,860

kooky people interested in it which is

2096

01:20:53,149 --> 01:20:51,420

fine but they're also you know a lot of

2097

01:20:55,189 --> 01:20:53,159

just normal people right who are like

2098

01:20:57,649 --> 01:20:55,199

for whatever reason

2099

01:20:59,750 --> 01:20:57,659

um you know push through the stigma I

2100

01:21:01,430 --> 01:20:59,760

just I I do

2101

01:21:02,390 --> 01:21:01,440

um and and

2102

01:21:05,090 --> 01:21:02,400

um

2103

01:21:07,250 --> 01:21:05,100

you know that that's I think I think the

2104

01:21:08,990 --> 01:21:07,260

next few years are going to be uh

2105

01:21:13,370 --> 01:21:09,000

extremely exciting

2106

01:21:16,070 --> 01:21:13,380

um well it's all up to you so

2107

01:21:19,149 --> 01:21:16,080

it's up to all of us up to all of us

2108

01:21:23,090 --> 01:21:22,010

look forward to it uh hopefully we can

2109

01:21:25,729 --> 01:21:23,100

do it again and good luck with

2110

01:21:27,770 --> 01:21:25,739

everything sir you too keep up the good

2111

01:21:29,689 --> 01:21:27,780

work all right thanks though thank you

2112

01:21:31,189 --> 01:21:29,699

so much Tom

2113

01:21:34,130 --> 01:21:31,199

wonderful talk

2114

01:21:36,830 --> 01:21:34,140

absolutely great yeah yeah really

2115

01:21:41,030 --> 01:21:36,840

really enjoyed that you know time flew

2116

01:21:42,770 --> 01:21:41,040

back time flew by and it's you know I I

2117

01:21:45,050 --> 01:21:42,780

think it's our both of our first time

2118

01:21:48,709 --> 01:21:45,060

really talking speaking with him anyway

2119

01:21:51,050 --> 01:21:48,719

right and I I look forward to I'd

2120

01:21:54,290 --> 01:21:51,060

welcome being able to talk with him more

2121

01:21:56,149 --> 01:21:54,300

in the future as as more uh news and

2122

01:21:59,990 --> 01:21:56,159

more developments come out in the days

2123

01:22:01,910 --> 01:22:00,000

and months ahead for sure for sure

2124

01:22:03,169 --> 01:22:01,920

um yeah that was great loved loved

2125

01:22:05,209 --> 01:22:03,179

talking to him and I know he doesn't do

2126

01:22:07,310 --> 01:22:05,219

this stuff very often so uh it's pretty

2127

01:22:08,750 --> 01:22:07,320

cool that he that he was able to do this

2128

01:22:11,630 --> 01:22:08,760

and we could pick his brain a little bit

2129

01:22:14,330 --> 01:22:11,640

we learned some pretty cool things like

2130

01:22:16,750 --> 01:22:14,340

some possible UAP baiting

2131

01:22:19,130 --> 01:22:16,760

yeah some other interesting things

2132

01:22:22,790 --> 01:22:19,140

absolutely and it's always interesting

2133

01:22:26,510 --> 01:22:22,800

to get a a you know a journalist take on

2134

01:22:28,729 --> 01:22:26,520

on situations like sure like the

2135

01:22:30,709 --> 01:22:28,739

pressures of of balancing National

2136

01:22:33,290 --> 01:22:30,719

Security versus the interests of the

2137

01:22:35,149 --> 01:22:33,300

public Mockingbird anything like that

2138

01:22:37,070 --> 01:22:35,159

and a little background on how they do

2139

01:22:39,770 --> 01:22:37,080

things right like well I'm talking to a

2140

01:22:41,870 --> 01:22:39,780

source that made doesn't even like the

2141

01:22:43,910 --> 01:22:41,880

other source they don't even you know

2142

01:22:45,830 --> 01:22:43,920

but and they're all saying the same

2143

01:22:49,430 --> 01:22:45,840

things like you know that's important

2144

01:22:51,169 --> 01:22:49,440

for the public at large to know that you

2145

01:22:52,970 --> 01:22:51,179

know um journalists aren't just coming

2146

01:22:54,770 --> 01:22:52,980

out there and putting together whatever

2147

01:22:56,630 --> 01:22:54,780

[h__h] and ball story they want like

2148

01:22:58,910 --> 01:22:56,640

they're approaching this like they were

2149

01:23:01,070 --> 01:22:58,920

trained to approach things multiple

2150

01:23:02,870 --> 01:23:01,080

sources from different areas they don't

2151
01:23:04,669 --> 01:23:02,880
communicate sometimes don't even like

2152
01:23:06,890 --> 01:23:04,679
each other and he's hearing the same

2153
01:23:09,229 --> 01:23:06,900
things you know so

2154
01:23:11,930 --> 01:23:09,239
that kind of stuff is good to know so

2155
01:23:15,470 --> 01:23:11,940
absolutely 100 we're gonna have Mario

2156
01:23:18,350 --> 01:23:15,480
Woods uh next week oh cool all right

2157
01:23:22,010 --> 01:23:18,360
great yeah well I I will I'm looking

2158
01:23:24,169 --> 01:23:22,020
forward to to coming up with a A list of

2159
01:23:26,689 --> 01:23:24,179
Juicy questions for sergeant Mario

2160
01:23:28,370 --> 01:23:26,699
that's that's fantastic yeah great for

2161
01:23:30,229 --> 01:23:28,380
those who don't know he was at uh

2162
01:23:32,570 --> 01:23:30,239
Ellsworth in the mid 70s had a crazy

2163
01:23:34,370 --> 01:23:32,580

experience

2164

01:23:36,229 --> 01:23:34,380

um at that nuclear base so we're going

2165

01:23:38,870 --> 01:23:36,239

to talk to him next week can't wait for

2166

01:23:40,910 --> 01:23:38,880

that yeah it'll be fun thanks to anybody

2167

01:23:42,709 --> 01:23:40,920

in the chat yeah that's going to be a

2168

01:23:45,649 --> 01:23:42,719

really good follow-up to Tom Rogan this

2169

01:23:49,010 --> 01:23:45,659

week covering covering UFOs and nukes

2170

01:23:51,229 --> 01:23:49,020

right good stuff thanks so much to

2171

01:23:53,209 --> 01:23:51,239

everybody in the chat uh for those that

2172

01:23:55,430 --> 01:23:53,219

weren't here last week didn't join us

2173

01:23:58,130 --> 01:23:55,440

last week happy New Year

2174

01:24:01,070 --> 01:23:58,140

um and uh we're looking forward to a

2175

01:24:03,110 --> 01:24:01,080

great 2023. absolutely

2176

01:24:05,090 --> 01:24:03,120

all right Belle love you man all right

2177

01:24:21,430 --> 01:24:05,100

love you too man I'll see you soon right

2178

01:24:36,669 --> 01:24:24,600

we're going to talk about flying saucers

2179

01:24:41,150 --> 01:24:39,470

flying suckers